Description of the Blog

I will share casual thoughts of mine here, primarily about philosophy.

Analysis Phenomenological Style

DEFINITION OF DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY: Ein unmittelbares Stück des Ganzen unterscheidet sich in der Weise der Explikation vom unmittelbaren unselbständigen Moment, und letzteres ist immer und notwendig „Eigenschaft“. Wir können Eigenschaft auch definieren als unmittelbares unselbständiges Moment eines Ganzen, oder als einen unmittelbaren Teil eines Ganzen, der neben sich im Ganzen keine unmittelbaren Teile hat, mit denen er „verbunden“ wäre.

COMMENT: I think this is how an analysis of Concepts and Phenomena is made through Phenomenological Description of the Gegebenheitsweise. Phenomenological analysis, in this sense, is to describe complex phenomena in simpler phenomena, as they present to consciousness. Of course this is not analysis by exact definition in terms of simpler concepts; nevertheless an exact definition of different concepts and phenomena is often the result. Different conceptions of Property are not only distinguished here, the definitions are also offered at the end, what is more, the whole process of Phenomenological Demonstration is Intuitively in order. His system can be formalized if you like, but this only involves part of the power it has. See, Kit Fine, Gilbert Null, Barry Smith, Peter Simons

Intentionality, perception, logical structure

“Logical structure” penetrates perception. As long as we perceive, even in a very primitive stage, intentionality functions in a structured way. The phenomena of “Certainty”, “Negation”, “Conjunction”, “Disjunction” and “Modality” can already be found at this primitive level.

However, at this level, it cannot be said that the experience is already “conceptual”, as it does not makes use of any concepts, such as “one”, “another”, “being”, “not”, “and”, “or” and “possible”, nevertheless it is “logical” in a sense. Whether experience should have all of the forms is an open question, however, it is beyond doubt that without the structure, experience is not possible at all.

The conditional, i.e., “if…then…” structure is somewhat complicated, because it originates from a somewhat complicated form of intentionality: protention, expectation.

However, the structure of Subject and Predicate, i.e., F(x), in predicate logic is a perhaps only a special example of pure logic which has something to do with our specific form of (temporal-spatially embodied) consciousness.

All the similar and identical features of various languages can be explained in a philosophy of mind which deals descriptively with intentionality. The privilege of this approach is that it explains the universal structure of language via descriptions of intentionality, and it does not have to make use of transcendental arguments to argue for the truth of some kind of a priori structure. It has great explanatory power as well as intuitiveness of demonstration.

Philosophy of language and philosophy of logic are branches of philosophy of mind. And insofar as philosophy of mind concerns itself with consciousness, it concerns with the universal structure of consciousness, i.e., intentionality.

The Measure

The idea is horrifying:
If there is a single measure or a set of measures of the meaning, richness, greatness of life, and if they are transparent to us.

Analytic Phenomenology

A precise definition of the problematic of Analytical Phenomenology will have to be worked out. But let us take that it is a combination of analytical philosophy and phenomenology.
It combines:
(1) Thematically, the primary concern with theories of consciousness, intentionality, and their relation to logic, epistemology, metaphysics etc. Shortly, Philosophy of Mind and Logic, Epistemology,Metaphysics.
(2) A method that makes use of modern logic and philosophical logic
(3) The phenomenological method needs some further refinements perhaps with help of logic and philosophical logic if the results of phenomenological reflection is going to be checked.
.
(n)
Of course this is only the roughest idea of this project.

Perhaps that phenomenology is not so popular today was due to historical accident, but it really needs some great representatives. The representatives will have to do some work that most philosophers will be under obligation to think over.

I am of course not under the illusion that I can do this kind of work.