Karl Mertens (Würzburg)

Mertens speciality lies in practical philosophy, he is one of the few Lehrstühle in Germany who has strong phenomenological (Husserlian) background.

In this september, there will be a big conference on Phenomenology in Würzburg.

Prof. Dr. Karl Mertens (Lehrstuhlinhaber)

Lehrstuhl II - Praktische Philosophie

Prof. Dr. Karl Mertens
Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Institut für Philosophie - Lehrstuhl II
Residenz - Südflügel
97070 Würzburg

Tel.: +49-(0)931-31-2857 (2859)
Fax: +49-(0)931-31-2855
eMail: karl.mertens@uni-wuerzburg.de

Two Harvard Analytic Phenomenologists: Sean Kelly and Susanna Siegel

Sean Kelly was a student of John Searle and Dreyfus, what a fascinating combination of teachers.
Susanna Siegel has done some very interesting work in the area of phenomenological method, esp., what counts as phenomenologically salient content. She is also a critic of the naturalistic theorists of intentional content such as Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, etc.

The two philosophers seem to make Havard one of the best places to study analytic phenomenology in the world!

So there are two analytic phenomenologists at Havard!

(1)

	Professor Sean D. Kelly Chair
	Emerson 302
	617-495-3915
	sdkelly@fas.harvard.edu
	http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~sdkelly
Sean Kelly earned an Sc.B. in Mathematics and Computer Science and an M.S. in Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences from Brown University in 1989. After several years as a graduate student in Logic and Methodology of Science, he finally received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley in 1998. He taught in Philosophy and the Humanities at Stanford and in Philosophy and Neuroscience at Princeton before joining the Harvard Faculty in 2006. His work focuses on various aspects of the philosophical, phenomenological, and cognitive neuroscientific nature of human experience. This gives him a broad forum: recent work has addressed, for example, the experience of time, the possibility of demonstrating that monkeys have blindsighted experience, and the understanding of the sacred in Homer. He has taught courses on 20th century French and German Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Perception, Imagination and Memory, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Literature. (2) Professor Susanna Siegel Placement Officer Emerson 317 617-495-1884 ssiegel@fas.harvard.edu http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/ Susanna Siegel received her PhD in 2000 from Cornell University. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. She is working on a book about the contents of visual perceptual experience. Some questions addressed in her papers include: What is the nature of perceptual experience? What kind of information does it convey to perceivers? How does perception enable us to have thoughts about the external world? What is the role of perception in uses of demonstrative expressions, such as "this" and "that fish" (and more generally, expressions of the form "that F")? Recent publications include: "The Contents of Perception", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal", Philosophical Studies 120 (2004) "Which Properties are Represented in Perception?" in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Perceptual Experience (Oxford University Press, 2006) "The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference," Philosophers' Imprint (2002) "Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience," Philosophical Review 115:3 "How Does Visual Phenomenology Constrain Object-seeing?", forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy "Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness," forthcoming in Philosophy & Phenomenological Research "Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives," Noûs, March 2006, vol 40 "The Phenomenology of Efficacy", forthcoming in Philosophical Topics Copies of these papers and others can be found on Prof Siegel's Web site .

Zahavi and Thomasson

Zahavi has some ambivalent thoughts about the interest from the side of analytical philosophers in phenomenology.

Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common
concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn
from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an
exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be
a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I
will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to
discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like
rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the
question of whether the current focus on the first-person perspective
might have a negative side-effect by giving us a slanted view of what
subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of
whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might
actually conceal some rather deep-rooted differences in the systematic
use these findings serve.(Zahavi 2007)

I think this attitude is quite understandable and I also share.

But there are also points that I cannot agree.

Amie Thomasson points out in her comments on Zahavi's paper, phenomenology is really better understood as transcendental if it is understood methodologically, and it really does not commit to any of the substantive views concerning the existence of the world and its relation to subjectivity. E.g., phenomenology per se, cannot give us argument concerning the real nature of the world, it does not accept, nor reject any version of idealism as it is traditionally understood. Although it might be compatible or incompatible with some of the versions.(Thomasson 2007) For example, if a version of idealism requires us to reject the structure of intentionality, which is an essential structure, then it is not compatible with the phenomenological insight, and it is therefore should be rejected on that ground. But certainly, many other versions of idealism can be perfectly compatible with phenomenological results.

But in any case, phenomenological essential insights are compatible with both idealism and realism, in the sense that it does not deny them nor accept them merely because they have the title as they do. This is not to deny, however, that it might not be compatible with some versions of them.

Again, about the status of consciousness and the world, Zahavi seems to hold that, consciousness is not on a par with the world. Surely it is not, but it would wrong to take this to be an ontological distinction, rather, this speaks out only an Epistemological Distinction, that we know our mind essentially differently from we know our minds(McCulloch 2003).