Two Harvard Analytic Phenomenologists: Sean Kelly and Susanna Siegel

Sean Kelly was a student of John Searle and Dreyfus, what a fascinating combination of teachers.
Susanna Siegel has done some very interesting work in the area of phenomenological method, esp., what counts as phenomenologically salient content. She is also a critic of the naturalistic theorists of intentional content such as Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, etc.

The two philosophers seem to make Havard one of the best places to study analytic phenomenology in the world!

So there are two analytic phenomenologists at Havard!

(1)

	Professor Sean D. Kelly Chair
	Emerson 302
	617-495-3915
	sdkelly@fas.harvard.edu
	http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~sdkelly
Sean Kelly earned an Sc.B. in Mathematics and Computer Science and an M.S. in Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences from Brown University in 1989. After several years as a graduate student in Logic and Methodology of Science, he finally received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley in 1998. He taught in Philosophy and the Humanities at Stanford and in Philosophy and Neuroscience at Princeton before joining the Harvard Faculty in 2006. His work focuses on various aspects of the philosophical, phenomenological, and cognitive neuroscientific nature of human experience. This gives him a broad forum: recent work has addressed, for example, the experience of time, the possibility of demonstrating that monkeys have blindsighted experience, and the understanding of the sacred in Homer. He has taught courses on 20th century French and German Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Perception, Imagination and Memory, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Literature. (2) Professor Susanna Siegel Placement Officer Emerson 317 617-495-1884 ssiegel@fas.harvard.edu http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/ Susanna Siegel received her PhD in 2000 from Cornell University. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. She is working on a book about the contents of visual perceptual experience. Some questions addressed in her papers include: What is the nature of perceptual experience? What kind of information does it convey to perceivers? How does perception enable us to have thoughts about the external world? What is the role of perception in uses of demonstrative expressions, such as "this" and "that fish" (and more generally, expressions of the form "that F")? Recent publications include: "The Contents of Perception", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal", Philosophical Studies 120 (2004) "Which Properties are Represented in Perception?" in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Perceptual Experience (Oxford University Press, 2006) "The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference," Philosophers' Imprint (2002) "Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience," Philosophical Review 115:3 "How Does Visual Phenomenology Constrain Object-seeing?", forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy "Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness," forthcoming in Philosophy & Phenomenological Research "Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives," Noûs, March 2006, vol 40 "The Phenomenology of Efficacy", forthcoming in Philosophical Topics Copies of these papers and others can be found on Prof Siegel's Web site .