About Me

I am a PhD student in Philosophy at Peking University, now staying at Universität zu Köln, Germany. My interests are primarily in Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology and Analytic Phenomenology. Now I am working on my Dissertation: Method, Intentionality, and Knowledge--An essay in analytic phenomenology. --------- I also have substantial interest in Early Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy and Ethics.

Saturday, August 30, 2008

The First Blog

Logical Zombie

Frege: Wir teilen danach alle Wahrheiten, die einer Begründung bedürfen, in zwei Arten, indem der Beweis bei den einen rein logisch vorgehen kann, bei den anderen sich auf Erfahrungstatsachen stützen muss. Es ist aber wohl vereinbar, dass ein Satz zu der ersteren Art gehört und doch ohne Sinnestätigkeit nie in einem menschlichen Geiste zum Bewusstsein kommen könnte.(Da ohne Sinneswahrnehmung keine geistige Entwickelung bei den uns bekannten Wesen möglich ist, so gilt das letztere von allen Urteilen)--Begriffschrift, Vorwort

S.L: Then the possibility of Logical zombie. Suppose for a certain subject A, whose division of sensibility has been developing in just the same way as normal human being, it might also develop a way of logical thinking, however, it is later entirely lost. After a certain kind of surgery, it acquires a entirely new way of logical thinking from the former one. This latter logical thinking system is just like the kind of system of a computer, or that of a Zombie. Then, the question is, can we say that the subject is a Person, or it is half a zombie and half a person, or it is not a person at all?

A dialogue about movies

In H.A

S.T: I think Kubrik's film The Clockwork Orange is a great one. It tells something deep about morality. Alex, after the psychological treatment, does not become a good person, though he gets sick and throws out whenever he does something evil or bad, or when he sees something evil or bad. Alex can not even bear the sight of evil things not because he has some kind of conscience or consciousness of morality, but simply because, after the psychological treatment, the physical reaction to something bad is an effect. It is so to say, a physical stimuli-response.

R.L: Yes, the person who has some conscience will also not endure morally bad things, and it is supposed to be different from the situation of Alex's. Alex is conditioned purely physically, and he then is supposed to have no conscience. But to be physically conditioned can not be the reason why we do not take him to be a morally conscious person. Because, if the all the facts are physical, and as human beings, we are physical, then our conscience is also somehow physically conditioned. The only difference might be that the causal chain of this conscience is relatively NORMAL and complicated. So the difference between Alex and morally conscious person does not in the causality, but in the Normality of the causality.