Reinach on Hume's Principle

Reinach thinks that Hume's principle that impression has corresponding ideas, and ideas presupposes impression are a priori principles(Was is Phänomenologie, 64).

These two principles happen to be important for phenomenologists too, in some sense: all forms of consciousness are either themselves ideas, or they must presuppose ideas.

And I think this is quite right.

Ryle and Ingarden

When Ryle was a young man (1927) 27, he publishes a review in Mind on Roman Ingarden's (1893-1970) essay "Essentiale Fragen", published in 1927. It is an interesting fact, though. At that time, it shows that Gilbert Ryle is quite familiar with phenomenological tradition.

Dummett

I decide that Dummett must play a role in my essay.
A Review is written by Barry Smith, which defends:
1.Husserl's account of Intentionality.
2. The Primacy of Intentional Analysis over Linguistic Analysis. (Shared by Husserl, Searle, Chisholm, etc)

Part-Whole Analysis as Method

Part-Whole Analysis does not only offer a substantial theory (that of Formal Ontology, according to one interpretation), it also offers a Method for Analysis. This view is accepted by: Sokolowski, Monhanty (2008), John Drummond(2002, 37), D. W. Smith (2002,64).

Someone doubts its central place in Husserl as a Method (Lohmar), and one is rightly to doubt because Part-Whole Analysis is impossilbe with still more fundamental analysis, i.e., Eidetic Variation. P-W analysis must presuppose the method of Eidetic Variation, implicitly or explicitly. The reason for this claim is that, the very essential distinction between Part and Whole, and different kinds of Parts and Wholes must be made essentially by reference to essential intuition, i.e., Eidetic Variation.

The Historical Development of Phe Method

1. Intentional Analysis
2.Phe Reduction
3. Eidetic Variation

But Actually, all of them are somewhat interrelated methods. Eidetic Variation and Phe Reduction are all somewhat implicitly in Intentional Analysis.

Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology

1.The ideas of phenomenology has naturalized versions in Analytic Philosophy of Mind.
2. Gilbert Ryle, John Searle are but two prominent examples of analytic philosophy of mind who has parellel theories to Husserl. One focuses on Methodological Dimension, the latter both.
3. Tim Crane has exactly the same ideas as Husserl.

My complain: 1.Naturalized.2.Unsystematic.3.Overlooking Phenomenological Dimension.

Semantic Category in Tarski, Gilbert Ryle and Husserl

The Test presented by Tarski to distinguish Semantic Categories is:

The Substitution Test.

This is mentioned by Mohanty.

This Test is closely followed by Gilbert Ryle in his theory of Categories and Category Mistake.

But, this is a theory-test developed by Husserl, every bit of it!

The Method and the Subject

Now, suppose my subject is Knowledge.
My Method requires that I know something about knowledge already. Otherwise, how I am going to know whether my analysis is a good analysis.

One cannot clarify what is not there, because it is not there.
One cannot clarify without knowing something he is to clarify.
If one does not know anything about Knowledge, what is it to know something. How can we expect one can present us a conception out of nowhere?

Examples Used in Analysis

When I need to give Example of "Essences", I can give the following example:
1. Intentional Essence, Epistemic Essence.
Now the first group of investigation is a peculiar thing to do, as it must already presuppose the following:
a) One must have a way to clarify things, to make distinctions.
b)But this requires one to have an idea what is a GOOD and adequate Analysis.
c) This requires one to have a kind of KNOWLEDGE. But this requires one to know what Count as Knowledge. But this requires one to have a conception of EPISTEMIC ESSENCE at first.
d)Therefore, one employs the standard and concepts one is ready to clarify, in order to clarify the to be clarified concepts.

This is like this: When one anylyses the concept of INTENTIONALITY, one must always use intentional concepts.
When one writes about Knowledge, one must know what counts as Knowledge.

Do I PRESUPPOSE a true understanding before I start clarify? If this is so, what is the point to clarify?

Is this circular? Maybe, but what is the problem with Circularity?
I have the particular conception. Though not clearly and systematically.

What is the difference before and after the Clarification.
a. Clarity is Obtained.
b. Before that, I use somewhat not so sharp tool to analyze a concept. In the process, our concept gets clearer and our tool gets sharper.
c.I must already have some conception of Knowledge, among other things. I use this conception, to get a clearer conception, and this clearer conception is now in my reserve. It becomes a useful tool.

The Same Can be said about Intentionaltiy. Eidetic Method.

2.Essence of Perception, and Imagination as founded form of Consciousness
3. Essence of Material Thing.
4. Essence of Dependent and Independent Parts, considered purely formally.

The phenomenological Transformation of Philosophical Question

The question: What is a representation? Becomes a phenomenological question, whose proper form is:

What kind of Intentional Analysis can we give for the concept of REPRESENTATION.

Klärung der Grundbegriffe.

Klärung und Scheidung der vielen Psychologie, Erkennistheorie und Logik ganz und gar verwrirrenden Begriffe, die das Wort Vorstellung angenommen hat, ist eine wichtige Aufgabe...

Husserl uses a method of Intentional Analysis to clarify the basic concepts. Which are quite CONFUSED concepts.

Analyse der Begriffe: Zickzack Weise

descriptive Fixierung der erschauten Wesen in reinen Begriffen (Hua XIX 23)
WESEN-WESENSGESETZTE
Analytische Untersuchungen.

Husserls Concept of Analysis

Die analytische Phänomenologie, deren der Logiker zu seinem vorbereitenden und grundlegenden Geschäfte bedarf, betrifft unter anderem und zunächst "Vorstellung" und des näheren ausdrückliche Vorstellung,. In diesen Komplexionen aber gehört sein primäres Interesse den an den "bloßen Ausdrücken" haftenden, in der Funktion der Bedeutungsintention oder Bedeutungserfüllung stehenden Erlebnissen. Indessen wird auch die sinnlichsprachliche Seite der Komplexionen und die Weise ihrer Verknüpfung mit dem beseelenden Bedeuten nicht ausser Acht bleiben dürfen...

Bedeutungsanalyse.(Intentionale Analyse)..Grammatische Analyse.

....das Verhältnis von Ausdruck und Bedeutung zu ANALYTISCHER KLARHEIT zu bringen und in dem "Rückgang von dem vagen Bedeuten zu dem ensprechenden artikulierten, klaren, mit der Fülle exemplarischer Anschauung gestättigten und sich daran erfüllenden Bedeuten das Mittel zu erkenen, wodurch die Frage, ob eine Unterscheidung als logische oder als bloß grammatiche zu gelten habe, in jedem gegebenen Falle entschieden werden kann.

Analytic Phenomenology

1.One should see the analytic method in application.
2.One should maintain that it is Phenomenological.
While in most of the book length essay none of the two principles are followed.

Outline for General Introduction

0. General Introduction: The Idea of Analytic Phenomenology
1. Husserl’s Concept of Philosophy (Moore, P. F. Strawson, Ayer and Husserl)
i. Philosophy
ii. Phenomenology and its Method (Reduction and Phenomena, Reflection, Essential Analysis and Description, Double Purity)
2. The Nature of the Analytic Phenomenology
i. Transcendental: (1) Critical: Phenomenological Transformation (2) Constitution. Philosophical.
ii. A Priori, Analytic: (1) Analytic Technique. Analytical
3. The Task of this Essay
i. Method
ii. Intentionality
iii. Knowledge

Stein Die Unfehlbarkeit der Wesensanschauung

Hua XXV, 246-248. Die Mathematik übt es über zweitausend Jahren. In der Begriffsbildung aller Wissenschaften hat es seine Rolle gespielt, ohne dass man sich darüber klar war. Nun ist es zur Klarheit gebracht, von allen Vermengungen befreit und methodisch ausgebildet werden...

Double Purity: Pure Phenomena and Pure Intuition of Essence

Hua XXV,112.
Doppelte Reinheit: die der transzendentalen Reduktion, die ihr ausschlisslich eigen ist, und die der eidetischen Intuition, die sie mit der reinen Geometrie gemein hat.

Also jeder phänomenologische Satz drückt inen Wesenszusammenhang aus und damit eine unbedingt gültige Gesetzmäßigkeit möglicher transzendentaler Phänomene überhaupt, die under den begrifflich fixierten Wesen stehen.

Something about Ayer

At a party that same year held by fashion designer Fernando Sanchez, Ayer, then 77, confronted Mike Tyson harassing the (then little-known) model Naomi Campbell. When Ayer demanded that Tyson stop, the boxer said: "Do you know who the fuck I am? I'm the heavyweight champion of the world," to which Ayer replied: "And I am the former Wykeham Professor of Logic. We are both pre-eminent in our field. I suggest that we talk about this like rational men".[5] Ayer and Tyson then began to talk, while Naomi Campbell slipped out.

Reformulation of Philosophical Questions

Es ist leicht nachzuweisen, dass erst auf dem Boden des phänomenologisch reinen Bewusstseins und im Rahmen einer reinen Phänomenologie alle vernunfttheoretischen Probleme wissenschaftlich streng formuliert und dann in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhang wirklich glöst werden.(Hua XXV, 80)

This might seem quite pretentious on Husserl's part. But it is no more pretentious than Ayer's Project or the project of linguistic analysis.Remember, Ayer thinks that all of the analytical philosophers are doing linguistic analysis. When someone asks the question: What is perception? The question really asked is about the use of language.

Ayer: "What is the nature of a material thing? is, like any other question of the form, a linguistic question, being a demand for a definition. And the propositions which are set forth in answer to it are linguistic propositions, even though they may be expressed in such a way that they seem to be factual. They are propositions about the relationship of symbols, and not about the properties of the things which the symbols denote" (Language Truth and Logic, 64-65)
Well, you just replace "LINGUISTIC" with "PHENOMENOLOGICAL", "DEFINITION" with "DESCRIPTION", "SYMBOLS" with "PHENOMENA" Then I think you get a parallel characterization of PHENOMENOLOGY.

That is, all philosophical questions must be formulated in the linguistic philosophical way. All of the real philosophical questions are questions concerning the use of language, or meaning, grammar of language.

What DIFFERENCE does it make!

One can:
1.Argue against all the old objections? Though in some kind of new way?
2.Organize all the old arguments? Then it becomes systematic?
3. Offers a new interpretation of someone's ideas?
En, not so exciting!What great DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?
To philosohize requires a lot of repetition,and it seldom comes to great originality, but one cannot deem my work worthwhile when it has nothing original to offer.

So, what can your idea make a DIFFERENCE. This is a real question.

Setback and REORIENTATION

I have been trying to write the Introduction to the part on Method, but I find this part totally unacceptable as the introduction. The reasons are:
1. It seems inappropriate for me now to begin the introduction with a discussion of Moore's and Strawson's conception of philosophy.Especially when it is 10 pages long.
2. It seems better if I concentrate on Husserl's conception of Philosophy, i.e., What counts as a philosophical problem? In order to ask the second question, WHAT IS THE METHOD TO SOLVE IT. Without a general conception of philosophy, it seems to me that it is hard to talk about a corresponding method. It is also worthwhile to mention in passing their conceptions of philosophy.
3. The question "What is Philosophy", seems to boil down to the question: "What is the difference between philosophical questions and other sorts of questions?
Generality? Universality?

REORIENTATION: The Dissertation begins with a discussion of Husserl's concept of Philosophy, or what counts as a philosophical problem and its answer. I will make use of Karl Schumann, as well as Mohanty's ideas.
Now the plan becomes something like this:
I. Method
0. Introduction: In Pursuit of Methods
0.1 Husserl’s Concept of Philosophy
0.2 Philosophical Method: Method as Critique and Method as Technique
1. Phenomenological Reduction, Reflection, and Constitutive Analysis
1.1 Method as Critique of Knowledge (LU)
1.2 Method as Critique of Subjectivity, and Constitutive Analysis (LU and Ideen I)
1.3 Phenomenological Residuum: Phenomena, Givenness, and Self-representation
2. Methodology Implicit in Logical Investigations
2.1 Husserl’s Theory of Part and Whole, Analysis and Synthesis (Bolzano, Brentano)
2.2 The Idea of Logical Grammar, Logico-grammatical Analysis (Wittgenstein, Ryle)
3. Eidetic Variation and Conceptual Analysis
3.1 Eidetic Variation, Free Imaginative Operation. Idea Variation (Bolzano)
3.2 A Linguistic Version of Eidetic Variation
3.3 Essential Intuition
4. Phenomenology as Philosophy of Mind, and its Method
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Phenomenological Method, The Concept of Mind, and Gilbert Ryle (The Connective Approach)
4.3 Phenomenological Method, Intentional Analysis, and John Searle

Essential Intuition as Experience and Method

In experience, of course there is some kind of essential intuition.Which amounts to a simple process, prima facie.

I think this is the condition of possibility of a Method making use of this particular ability of the mind.

Hence, the Methodological sense of Essential Intuition, which is a quite complex process and requires quite a lot analytical power.

From a philosophical point of view, when you try to describe the SIMPLE operation of the mind when it apprehends something in general, i.e., a mathematical truth.It seems to be a highly complex thing to do, and the SIMPLE process seems to involve some highly complex operations of mind.And only a highly complex method seems adequate to describe the complex operation, which itself makes use of the original complex operation.

Simple things are never SIMPLE!

The accusation, that this method requires mystic Intuition, is partially due to the confusion between the two senses.

Subjectivity and Phenomena

Of course Subjectivity, Constitution, etc are the TOPICS that characterize Transcendental Phenomenology. But the Method that reveals that area to us is transcendental reduction,the epistemic access is via phenomena, which guarantees high degree of evidence. This move of reflection and critique actually involves two moments: A thematical moment and a critical moment. The Theme is subjectivity, but it is not an empirical search in any obvious sense, but an essential analysis using the data that phenomenological reduction has supplied.

But actually, the two steps are never separated. Phenomena are not bare Phenomena, they already have meanings, and sometimes the structure really appears to be there, and this already presupposes that the mind has some kind of ability of general thinking, even if the method of Eidetic Variation does not start to work.But, an account of how do we know GENERALLY can have the form of PREPREDICATIVE EIDETIC VARIATION.After seeing many cases of the same thing, we conclude that it is an essence that.....Theory of TYPES?

However, an explicit account of the Eidetic Variation is still needed for an operative purpose and for its epistemological critique.

开始写论文

最终我还是开始写我的论文了。
我想，经过一个月的练习写作，写了大概55页，25000英文词(5月中旬-6月中旬)。
以及经过一个月的重新调整，主要是重新确定题目以及构思整体内容（6月中旬-7月中旬）。
把题目确定为Method,Intentionality and Knowledge-An Essay in Analytic Phenomenology.
就我看来，这三个题目每个都可以写一篇博士论文，但是我的目的并不是写一篇博士论文就够了，我是想尽可能地把这篇博士论文1。作为对以前所学的东西的一个总结。2。把这个博士论文作为以后对哲学比较理论性的部分的一个起点。（伦理学和政治哲学也是我兴趣的一部分，但是这里完全不会涉及到。）

所以，里面不会涉及到太仔细的阐述和论证。此外，其实自己能够说点什么东西的地方暂时并没有那么多，写的太过仔细，可能就会多出更多阐述性的东西，而不是论证性的和创造性的。实际上，这些题目也并非不可以往小里写。

第一部分当然还是关于方法论的。主要目的是：把胡塞尔的方法论重新阐释，将其解释为两个部分，从而勾勒出一个分析现象学方法的全貌：

1。将方法作为批判。第一部分当然指的是哲学相对于自然科学和其他科学特有的反思性特征，这点通过现象学还原来实现，通过批判认知的主体性来实现，在分析哲学里通过特有的对语言和概念的分析，而非直接对对象进行分析来实现。（Reduction to Phenomena and Subjectivity v.s. Reduction to Concepts and Language with which we grasp reality or talk about reality）但是，概念和语言能力作为主体性的一种表现，最终可以追溯到主体性和心灵运作。Searle认为，胡塞尔也会认同，我也会赞成的是，语言哲学是心灵哲学的一部分，对mental concepts的研究最终涉及到的是对mental representation（当然这里不是表象主意的那种表象），或者意向性的研究。

2。将方法作为技术。这里的技术，主要指的是各种分析方法。例如，对整体与部分的分析方法，建立限制概念运作的逻辑语法的方法，思想实验以及本质还原的方法，意向性分析方法，等。在分析哲学里相对应的，仍然是分析的方法，语言分析方法，逻辑语法观念（Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, etc）的运用，意向性分析的方法(John Searle)。

第一部分是用来保证哲学的反思属性。方法的第二部分则是用来通过技术性的操作来得出具体的哲学结论。那么现象学的特征的哲学特征当然是方法论的第一部分来规定，至于技术性的部分，就是分析性的部分了。因此，Analytic Phenomenology.Analytic Phenomenology is Analytic and Phenomenological.


不过，回过头来，反思的方法可以有比较技术化的属性，而技术化的部分也必须要有反思的属性，因为这样一个问题总是可以问的：你这个技术可不可靠？你所得到结果是不是可以辩护的？

Method

This is a very rough sketch of what I am going to write on.

1. Method
0. Introduction: In Pursuit of Methods
0.1 Reflection and The Nature of Philosophical Problems (Moore, P. F. Strawson and Husserl)
0.2 Philosophical Method: Method as Technique and Method as Critique
1. Methodology Implicit in Logical Investigations
1.1 Husserl’s Theory of Part and Whole, Analysis and Synthesis (Bolzano, Brentano)
1.2 The Idea of Logical Grammar (Wittgenstein, Ryle)
2. Phenomenological Reduction, Reflection, and Constitutive Analysis
2.1 Phenomenological Residuum: Phenomena, Givenness, and Self-representation
2.2 Reflection and the Disclosure of Subjectivity
2.3 Constitutive Analysis
3. Eidetic Variation and Conceptual Analysis
3.1 Eidetic Variation, Free Imaginative Operation. Idea Variation (Bolzano)
3.2 A Linguistic Version of Eidetic Variation
3.3 Essential Intuition
4. The Connective Approach
4.1 The Connective Conception of Analysis: Gilbert Ryle and P. F. Strawson
4.2 John Searle and Intentional Analysis
4.3 The Connective Approach and Analytic Phenomenology
5. Phenomenology as Philosophy of Mind, and its Method
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Phenomenological Method, The Concept of Mind, and Gilbert Ryle
5.3 Phenomenological Method, Intentional Analysis, and John Searle

Grammatical Jokes. Atom is Bigger Than Universe

There are some deep jokes because of the abuse of grammar.
I think one of my professors used to tell a joke like this:
An atom is bigger than nothing.
Nothing is bigger than the Universe.
..............................................................
Therefore: An atom is bigger than the Universe. (Rule of Transitivity)

Or this one:
The Witch: Alice, could please find out what is happening outside, I am blind and cannot see.
Alice: It is very dark outside, I see Nothing!
The Witch: Ah! Your eyesight is indeed very good, you can see Nothing!

Or the following, which is my own:
90% of the brain is water.
Mind is Brain (Identity Theorists Position)
-------------------------------------------
90% of the Mind is water!

Not Funny at All?
脑子进水了，还不是一点！

不过你知道为什么脑子进水还是这么聪明么？看了下面的图片你就知道了。
解释下：比利时鲁汶大学附近的一个雕像，看样子是脑子进水，但是名字是·智慧之泉。
Fons Sapientiae,FOUNTAIN OF WISDOM

脑子进水了，一直在进！

Wittgenstein:The (philosophical) problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes, there roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language.--Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (PI, 111)

Hillel's Argument against Husserl's View Concerning Logical Grammar and Objections.

Hillel is a major Disciple of Carnap.
Argument 1: "I shall state these respects somewhat dogmatically here, as I already discussed this question at some length elsewhere. First, it is simply not the case, at least not prima face so, that an adjec- tival matter appearing in a significant text can never be replaced by a nominal matter, yielding again a significant text. It is beyond doubt that 'this tree is a plant' is significant and still is obtainable from 'this tree is green' by just such a replacement."
Objection
S1. This tree is a plant.
S2.This tree is green.
Well, Hillel's step must involve replacements of two meanings to make "this tree is green" significant. He must replace "is" in S2 the "property-signifying" sign with "is" in S1 the "individual-species-signifying" sign. And he must replace "green" with "plant". The first step is obviously very important, otherwise, "This tree" would be an individual belonging to the species of Green, which will be a shade of green, say, Green.24. Which will not be significant at all.
S1 and S2 are of seemingly identical grammatical structure, but grammar is surely of some importance for logical investigation, but it is no sure guidance for investigation into significance, logical meanings, etc.

Argument 2: The terms 'sentence,' 'significant,' 'silly,' and 'ridiculous' are not sufficiently univocal to attach much significance to the results of a questionnaire in which the testees will have to tell whether according to their intuition the word-sequence 'this algebraic number is green' is a sentence and, if so, whether it is non-significant or significant but silly or ridiculous. Husserl's assertion that "through the free replace- ment of matters within their category there may result false, silly, or ridi- culous meanings (whole sentences or possible sentence-parts), but still necessarily unitary meanings... ," as a factual statement, is therefore of doubtful validity.

Objection: Simple, who says Husserl's statement is a factual statement in the sense that"#is green hot# is meaningless or absurd" is a factual statement? It might well be an apriori statement. If there is no such statement as apriori statement, such statements are different from factual statements.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol.17.

An apriori Argument for Causality.

1. Two physical objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
2. In a space where O1 occupies the place of O2, then O2 must move to another place.
3. The event 2 we consider that O1 is the cause of the movement of O2.
4. So causality can be considered to be implied by the definition of physical objects and space.
5. And this is an apriori Argument for causality. Counter Hume.

Philip Pettit on Phenomenology

It is curious to find that Philip Pettit also begins his career with Phenomenology, at least, partially. His first ever publication is on phenomenology. In another paper "On Phenomenology as a Methodology of Philosophy" He writes:
It might question the area of concern assigned to philosophy--man in his conscious behaviour--or might question the way in which philosophy is supposed to master this area--by experience and description....
What we need for our critique of Husserl is a theory of the relation of experience and description....The relation is simple in the case of low-level description, where to describe is to give an account of how the data appear in a particular experience. The relation is naturally more complex in high-level description, where the description synthesises the data of many different experiences in terms of some overall pattern. In phenomenological philosophy it is clearly low-level description which is meant to be invovled, description based in each case on a particular experience. This is description in the proper sense. High-level description is really a matter of processing data which, in the strict sense, have already been described.
But this is obviously FALSE. It is actually high-level description that is in question for Phenomenology, i.e., to reveal the essence of Perception, etc, and the entireconceptual structure of mental concepts, etc.

Pettit's other criticisms are:
1. Phenomenological Description does not have intrinsic philosophical value.
2. There is no inner perception of both experience and essence, because there are no such things.
3. Husserl's description seems to require private language, which is quite absurd.
4. It is explainatio, not description, that is the task of philosophy. This is a critique of both Husserl and Wittgenstein.
His positive comments on Phenomenology are:
1. Phenomenology is right in consider the subject of philosophy is conscious human behaviour.
2. Phenomenological description is preparatory for Philosophical Explanation. Because before one starts explanation, one must know what he is explaining. According to Pettit, Gilbert Ryle, in The Concept of Mind, appeals to the subject's consciousness and to the description which this would force him to gvie of what it means to understand an argument.

Finally, Considering Phenomenology as preparotory is not uncommon. Pettit thinks it is preparation for explaination, Searle, by Contrast, thinks that phenomenology is preparation for logical analysis. Searle writes: "But the point is that the phenomenological investigation is only the beginning. You then have to go on and investigate logical structures, most of which are not often accessible to phenomenology. And, of course, in the course of the investigation, phenomenology plays another role: it sets conditions."

Phenomnenology: Narrow and Wider

In LU, according to Moran's interpretation, Husserl thinks Phenomenology is a descriptive psychology for clarifying epistemological and logical concepts and operations.

But certainly this is a too narrow conception, for there is much more to mental life or intentional conscious life than merely epistemic and logical operations.

But of course it is doubtful that Husserl actually has such a narrow conception of phenomenology at the time.

Husserlian Intuition and Russellian Acquaintance

It is not uncommon among the interpreters that Husserlian Intuition is not unlike Russellian Acquaintance. In Husserl there is a distinction between Empirical Intuition and Essential Intuition, in Russell, there is a distinction between Acquaintance of Particular and Acquaintance of Universal. This view is hold by the logician Hinttika (in Phenomenological Dimension) and Dermot Moran(in The Meaning of Phnomenology in Husserl's Logical Investigations), and some others are more than willing to follow this interpretation.

Despite the similarities, this is obviously quite inadequate. Consider Russell's characterization of Acquaintance:

To begin with, as in most cognitive words, it is natural to say that I am acquainted with an object even at moments when it is not actually before my mind, provided it has been before my mind, and will be again whenever occasion arises. This is the same sense in which I am said to know that 2+2 = 4 even when I am thinking of something else. In the second place, the word acquaintancwe is desianed to emphasize, more than the word presen.tation, the relational character of the fact with which we are concerned. There is, to my mind, a danger that, in speaking of presentationis, we may so emphasize the object as to lose sight of the subject.(Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description, p109 )

So a person S can be said to be aquainted with an object O (particular or universal)at time t1 even if one is not in any sense thinking or perceiving O at t1. Obviously, this is not the same with the concept of "Intuition" in Husserl's sense, which requires that person S occurently has access to O.