It is not uncommon among the interpreters that Husserlian Intuition is not unlike Russellian Acquaintance. In Husserl there is a distinction between Empirical Intuition and Essential Intuition, in Russell, there is a distinction between Acquaintance of Particular and Acquaintance of Universal. This view is hold by the logician Hinttika (in Phenomenological Dimension) and Dermot Moran(in The Meaning of Phnomenology in Husserl's Logical Investigations), and some others are more than willing to follow this interpretation.
Despite the similarities, this is obviously quite inadequate. Consider Russell's characterization of Acquaintance:
To begin with, as in most cognitive words, it is natural to say that I am acquainted with an object even at moments when it is not actually before my mind, provided it has been before my mind, and will be again whenever occasion arises. This is the same sense in which I am said to know that 2+2 = 4 even when I am thinking of something else. In the second place, the word acquaintancwe is desianed to emphasize, more than the word presen.tation, the relational character of the fact with which we are concerned. There is, to my mind, a danger that, in speaking of presentationis, we may so emphasize the object as to lose sight of the subject.(Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description, p109 )
So a person S can be said to be aquainted with an object O (particular or universal)at time t1 even if one is not in any sense thinking or perceiving O at t1. Obviously, this is not the same with the concept of "Intuition" in Husserl's sense, which requires that person S occurently has access to O.
Despite the similarities, this is obviously quite inadequate. Consider Russell's characterization of Acquaintance:
To begin with, as in most cognitive words, it is natural to say that I am acquainted with an object even at moments when it is not actually before my mind, provided it has been before my mind, and will be again whenever occasion arises. This is the same sense in which I am said to know that 2+2 = 4 even when I am thinking of something else. In the second place, the word acquaintancwe is desianed to emphasize, more than the word presen.tation, the relational character of the fact with which we are concerned. There is, to my mind, a danger that, in speaking of presentationis, we may so emphasize the object as to lose sight of the subject.(Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description, p109 )
So a person S can be said to be aquainted with an object O (particular or universal)at time t1 even if one is not in any sense thinking or perceiving O at t1. Obviously, this is not the same with the concept of "Intuition" in Husserl's sense, which requires that person S occurently has access to O.
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