About Me

I am a PhD student in Philosophy at Peking University, now staying at Universität zu Köln, Germany. My interests are primarily in Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology and Analytic Phenomenology. Now I am working on my Dissertation: Method, Intentionality, and Knowledge--An essay in analytic phenomenology. --------- I also have substantial interest in Early Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy and Ethics.

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Belief, Knowing: Occurrent (lived) and Dispositional

Certainly I "believe" a lot of things even if I am not currently thinking about the things I believe. But am I not conscious of them, even in my "Background or Peripheral Consciousness"? It is to say that unconscious beliefs are suspicious things. And unconscious beliefs can be intentional are still more doubtful.

And suppose I hold the belief "It is raining", it is connected with a network of beliefs, which function in the background, they have a sort of intentionality, background intentionality. But of course occurrent beliefs are different from not occurrent beliefs that function as background of the occurrent beliefs.

And, when I am in dreamless sleep, I am not conscious at all, and I do not have any beliefs, occurrently or peripherally. Phenomenology, as such, does not discuss unconsciousness in this sense.

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