Suppose S has the intentional state of believing p (a perceptual belief, in this case). The condition of satisfaction, as Searle conceives, then is p.
Now consider Husserl's conception of fulfillment, it requires that it has evidence that p, in the most prominent case, S has the intuitive, noninferential evidence that p.
Satisfaction condition is not the kind of thing that is first person available, whereas evidence should be.
Therefore condition of satisfaction and condition of fulfillment is essentially different, despite the similarities.
A problem though, fulfillment is a so-called success word, that is, it is a word for sucess of fulfillment, it is the final stage of the process of fulfilling. But the first person available evidence for perceptual belief is always corrigible, therefore perhaps is better to use fufilling condition rather than fulfillment condition. However, this also has its problem. Fulfilling is always fufilling toward fulfillment of certain intentional state, what if the fulfilling evidence turns out to be non-fulfilling for the original belief but rather another? The skeptical question here is this, if you do not know what this evidence is fulfilling, you do not know if it is fulfilling at all. But, if you want to know what the evidence is fulfilling, you will have to have fulfilling evidence. Sounds hoplessly circular!
Now consider Husserl's conception of fulfillment, it requires that it has evidence that p, in the most prominent case, S has the intuitive, noninferential evidence that p.
Satisfaction condition is not the kind of thing that is first person available, whereas evidence should be.
Therefore condition of satisfaction and condition of fulfillment is essentially different, despite the similarities.
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