Method

Searle, p. 26:Explanation of Intentionality offered in this chapter is not a logical analysis in the sense of giving necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of simpler notions. If we tried to treat the explanation as an analysis it would be hopelessly circular because the feature of speech acts that I have been using to explain the Intentionality of certain intentional states is precisely the Intentionality of speech atcs. In my view it is not possible to give a logical analysis of Intentionality of the mental in terms of simpler notions, since Intentionality is, so to speak, a ground floor property of the mind, not a logically complex feature built up by combining simpler elemtns. There is no neutral standpoint from which we can survey the relations between Intentional states and th world and then describe them in non-Intentionalistic terms. Any explanation of Intentionality, therefore, takes place within the circle of Intentional concepts.