Conceptual analysis is substantially involved with how a proposition can fail to make sense. It is to show, how a proposition, e.g. "Red is on the desk" fails to make sense and therefore fails to have truth condition at all. By doing so, you may know what makes the category "Property" and "Object", different.
Intentional analysis, by contrast, applies not to speech acts, sentences, but also to intentional states like beliefs, desires, etc. It shows, e.g., what are the satisfaction conditions, directions of fit of intentional states, what distinguishes them. This analysis shows you the how mental or other sorts of concepts differ.
Eidetic variation, I suppose, is connected to both of them still different. You vary the x in the sentential function "x...is on the desk", some fit and some do not and yield nonsense. You see you have different types of things. In intentional analysis, e.g., "S believes p", "S desires p", "S *Y* x", you vary *Y* x, you have different types of psychological mode and intentional content. You have different types of mental acts, etc.
Then, I suppose, Eidetic Variation seems to be a more general method, but like all substantial analyses, it can also have its linguistic version, and it can also have its intentional analytical version. It seems to me, then, Amie Thomasson's conjecture that Husserl fails to make use of his conception of "Nonsense" in his investigation of logical grammar is false. Eidetic Variation, it seems to me, is more comprehensive in the respect that it is more general.
Still, it has another advantage. It offers an epistemology with regard to the knowledge of the operations and products of the method, i.e., philosophical data, procedure and final insights. It offers an account for how Phenomena is Known through an exposition of phenomenological reflection, it also offers an account for how Categories or concepts are know through an account of categorial intuition. Even though, both accounts are very suspicious as they are often taken to committ Platonic mistakes.
Intentional analysis, by contrast, applies not to speech acts, sentences, but also to intentional states like beliefs, desires, etc. It shows, e.g., what are the satisfaction conditions, directions of fit of intentional states, what distinguishes them. This analysis shows you the how mental or other sorts of concepts differ.
Eidetic variation, I suppose, is connected to both of them still different. You vary the x in the sentential function "x...is on the desk", some fit and some do not and yield nonsense. You see you have different types of things. In intentional analysis, e.g., "S believes p", "S desires p", "S *Y* x", you vary *Y* x, you have different types of psychological mode and intentional content. You have different types of mental acts, etc.
Then, I suppose, Eidetic Variation seems to be a more general method, but like all substantial analyses, it can also have its linguistic version, and it can also have its intentional analytical version. It seems to me, then, Amie Thomasson's conjecture that Husserl fails to make use of his conception of "Nonsense" in his investigation of logical grammar is false. Eidetic Variation, it seems to me, is more comprehensive in the respect that it is more general.
Still, it has another advantage. It offers an epistemology with regard to the knowledge of the operations and products of the method, i.e., philosophical data, procedure and final insights. It offers an account for how Phenomena is Known through an exposition of phenomenological reflection, it also offers an account for how Categories or concepts are know through an account of categorial intuition. Even though, both accounts are very suspicious as they are often taken to committ Platonic mistakes.
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