The Phenomenal and the Phenomenological

It is very common that the use of the Term "Phenomenological" is quite confusing. Consider the two typical expressions.
1) My phenomenology* of seeing an apple is different from my phenomenology of seeing a pineapple.
2) The phenomenology** of perception is different from the phenomenology of imagination.
Obviously, phenomenology* is different from phenomenology**. The former is used in an "experiential" sense, it says only that the experiential aspects in two cases of experiences are different. While the latter states that as two complex theories or description of two different kinds of experiences, they are different. In this sense, Phenomenology** is a disciplinary subject.

So may be it would be better to substitute phenomenology* with phenomenography, or some other terms, to avoid this ambiguity. Confusion of first order things and higher order things always tends to cause trouble in philosophizing.

We can say that phenomenology** is a discipline on Phenomenology*. But of course, Phenomenology** also must have its Phenomenology**(*), because in doing phenomenology, we obviously also have a Phenomenology*, which is different from doing Mathematics or Physics. This reiteration can go further, of course.

Of course phenomenology** can also have naturalistic and non-naturalistic (not anti-naturalistic) versions. Most analytic phenomenologists in the analytical philosophy tradition has a version of naturalistic phenomenology. E.g., Charlse Siewert (2006, In Favour of Plain Phenomenology; 2007, Who is afraid of Phenomenological Disputes), as well as Susanna Siegel, etc. Tim Crane is the single person I have known in the analytical tradition who comes closest to a non-naturalistic conception of phenomenology, at least and esp. when it comes to his theory of intentionality, esp., of intentional object.

Must Causality be present in the content of perceptual experience?

John Searle's answer is "Yes". Not only it is true that causality belongs to the contents of perceptual experience, it is also argued that it is also experienced and discoverable from the first person perspective. That amounts to say:
1) When we perceive x, we do not only perceive x, under some aspects (e.g., x as such and such).
2) We also perceive x as the cause of our current perception, and this belongs to the content of this perception.
3) Upon reflection of the perception of x, we can have epistemic access to the experience of x as the cause of my perception of x.

But Searle's point seems to be dubious when it comes to 2) and 3). Shortly put, it is possible and very often that when we perceive x, we also experience x as the cause of our perception of x, and upon reflection we have access to this fact. However, this by no means suggest that for every perception, experience of causation must also be present in the entire content. I think it is not implausible that people can have perception without having a concept of causation at all. Thought experienment needs to be done, and a variation needs to be given to make this point...

So experience of causation is not a necessary condition for one to have perception. Now another question is, is it a sufficient condition?

Zahavi and Thomasson

Zahavi has some ambivalent thoughts about the interest from the side of analytical philosophers in phenomenology.

Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common
concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn
from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an
exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be
a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I
will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to
discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like
rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the
question of whether the current focus on the first-person perspective
might have a negative side-effect by giving us a slanted view of what
subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of
whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might
actually conceal some rather deep-rooted differences in the systematic
use these findings serve.(Zahavi 2007)

I think this attitude is quite understandable and I also share.

But there are also points that I cannot agree.

Amie Thomasson points out in her comments on Zahavi's paper, phenomenology is really better understood as transcendental if it is understood methodologically, and it really does not commit to any of the substantive views concerning the existence of the world and its relation to subjectivity. E.g., phenomenology per se, cannot give us argument concerning the real nature of the world, it does not accept, nor reject any version of idealism as it is traditionally understood. Although it might be compatible or incompatible with some of the versions.(Thomasson 2007) For example, if a version of idealism requires us to reject the structure of intentionality, which is an essential structure, then it is not compatible with the phenomenological insight, and it is therefore should be rejected on that ground. But certainly, many other versions of idealism can be perfectly compatible with phenomenological results.

But in any case, phenomenological essential insights are compatible with both idealism and realism, in the sense that it does not deny them nor accept them merely because they have the title as they do. This is not to deny, however, that it might not be compatible with some versions of them.

Again, about the status of consciousness and the world, Zahavi seems to hold that, consciousness is not on a par with the world. Surely it is not, but it would wrong to take this to be an ontological distinction, rather, this speaks out only an Epistemological Distinction, that we know our mind essentially differently from we know our minds(McCulloch 2003).