Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common
concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn
from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an
exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be
a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I
will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to
discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like
rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the
question of whether the current focus on the first-person perspective
might have a negative side-effect by giving us a slanted view of what
subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of
whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might
actually conceal some rather deep-rooted differences in the systematic
use these findings serve.(Zahavi 2007)
I think this attitude is quite understandable and I also share.
But there are also points that I cannot agree.
Amie Thomasson points out in her comments on Zahavi's paper, phenomenology is really better understood as transcendental if it is understood methodologically, and it really does not commit to any of the substantive views concerning the existence of the world and its relation to subjectivity. E.g., phenomenology per se, cannot give us argument concerning the real nature of the world, it does not accept, nor reject any version of idealism as it is traditionally understood. Although it might be compatible or incompatible with some of the versions.(Thomasson 2007) For example, if a version of idealism requires us to reject the structure of intentionality, which is an essential structure, then it is not compatible with the phenomenological insight, and it is therefore should be rejected on that ground. But certainly, many other versions of idealism can be perfectly compatible with phenomenological results.
But in any case, phenomenological essential insights are compatible with both idealism and realism, in the sense that it does not deny them nor accept them merely because they have the title as they do. This is not to deny, however, that it might not be compatible with some versions of them.
Again, about the status of consciousness and the world, Zahavi seems to hold that, consciousness is not on a par with the world. Surely it is not, but it would wrong to take this to be an ontological distinction, rather, this speaks out only an Epistemological Distinction, that we know our mind essentially differently from we know our minds(McCulloch 2003).
concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn
from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an
exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be
a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I
will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to
discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like
rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the
question of whether the current focus on the first-person perspective
might have a negative side-effect by giving us a slanted view of what
subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of
whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might
actually conceal some rather deep-rooted differences in the systematic
use these findings serve.(Zahavi 2007)
I think this attitude is quite understandable and I also share.
But there are also points that I cannot agree.
Amie Thomasson points out in her comments on Zahavi's paper, phenomenology is really better understood as transcendental if it is understood methodologically, and it really does not commit to any of the substantive views concerning the existence of the world and its relation to subjectivity. E.g., phenomenology per se, cannot give us argument concerning the real nature of the world, it does not accept, nor reject any version of idealism as it is traditionally understood. Although it might be compatible or incompatible with some of the versions.(Thomasson 2007) For example, if a version of idealism requires us to reject the structure of intentionality, which is an essential structure, then it is not compatible with the phenomenological insight, and it is therefore should be rejected on that ground. But certainly, many other versions of idealism can be perfectly compatible with phenomenological results.
But in any case, phenomenological essential insights are compatible with both idealism and realism, in the sense that it does not deny them nor accept them merely because they have the title as they do. This is not to deny, however, that it might not be compatible with some versions of them.
Again, about the status of consciousness and the world, Zahavi seems to hold that, consciousness is not on a par with the world. Surely it is not, but it would wrong to take this to be an ontological distinction, rather, this speaks out only an Epistemological Distinction, that we know our mind essentially differently from we know our minds(McCulloch 2003).
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