About Me

I am a PhD student in Philosophy at Peking University, now staying at Universität zu Köln, Germany. My interests are primarily in Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology and Analytic Phenomenology. Now I am working on my Dissertation: Method, Intentionality, and Knowledge--An essay in analytic phenomenology. --------- I also have substantial interest in Early Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy and Ethics.

Monday, August 3, 2009

Phe Idealism as an answer to a Phe Question

Idealism is an answer to Phe Question.
What is the World and Physical thing, if answered from a phenomenological point of view?
The question should be reformulated as: What is the modes of givenness of physical thing in consciousness? Or what are the conscious moments that are conscious of the physical thing as a physical thing.
And, consequently:
Epistemological: Such and such is evident, and they display such and such a structure to consciousness.
Contitutional: The answer is that it is the result of constitution of mind.

But this cannot be realistically interpreted, because this is first to interpret the question, and then the answer in a wrong way. And no wonder people will find this kind of idealism uninteresting.

Almost all of the realistic interpreters cannot grasp what is a proper Phe question to ask, and then they misinterpret and misconceive the answer to this question.

The way to misunderstand can be the following:
Phe Idealism is an answer to a unmodified realistic question.

But actually one should see:
Phe answer is the answer to the special Phe question.
And this is not to deny, as a special answer, it can have general implications for other questions.

I accept:
1. Phenomenological direct realism and externalism.
2. Phenomenological transcendental idealism.
3. 1 is a consequence of 2.

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