Tienson at least provisionally endorses the assumption that
the Cartesian situation is possible. His position seems to be
this: this assumption is highly intuitive and, hence, should be
accepted so long as there is no compelling argument against it.
The considerations that are often taken to undercut this
assumption show only that successful reference requires that a
subject stand in the relevant causal relations to an external
environment. They do not show that entertaining intentional
contents requires this. Moreover, he thinks that there is a
plausible story about how narrow contents can contribute to
reference, in the proper environmental context.1 He concludes
that the assumption survives the standard externalist arguments
and that a thinker who is in the Cartesian situation will
know “plenty,” including “that he is presented with a rich,
complex, and coherent world” (Tienson, 58).
the Cartesian situation is possible. His position seems to be
this: this assumption is highly intuitive and, hence, should be
accepted so long as there is no compelling argument against it.
The considerations that are often taken to undercut this
assumption show only that successful reference requires that a
subject stand in the relevant causal relations to an external
environment. They do not show that entertaining intentional
contents requires this. Moreover, he thinks that there is a
plausible story about how narrow contents can contribute to
reference, in the proper environmental context.1 He concludes
that the assumption survives the standard externalist arguments
and that a thinker who is in the Cartesian situation will
know “plenty,” including “that he is presented with a rich,
complex, and coherent world” (Tienson, 58).
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