It is very common that the use of the Term "Phenomenological" is quite confusing. Consider the two typical expressions.
1) My phenomenology* of seeing an apple is different from my phenomenology of seeing a pineapple.
2) The phenomenology** of perception is different from the phenomenology of imagination.
Obviously, phenomenology* is different from phenomenology**. The former is used in an "experiential" sense, it says only that the experiential aspects in two cases of experiences are different. While the latter states that as two complex theories or description of two different kinds of experiences, they are different. In this sense, Phenomenology** is a disciplinary subject.
So may be it would be better to substitute phenomenology* with phenomenography, or some other terms, to avoid this ambiguity. Confusion of first order things and higher order things always tends to cause trouble in philosophizing.
We can say that phenomenology** is a discipline on Phenomenology*. But of course, Phenomenology** also must have its Phenomenology**(*), because in doing phenomenology, we obviously also have a Phenomenology*, which is different from doing Mathematics or Physics. This reiteration can go further, of course.
Of course phenomenology** can also have naturalistic and non-naturalistic (not anti-naturalistic) versions. Most analytic phenomenologists in the analytical philosophy tradition has a version of naturalistic phenomenology. E.g., Charlse Siewert (2006, In Favour of Plain Phenomenology; 2007, Who is afraid of Phenomenological Disputes), as well as Susanna Siegel, etc. Tim Crane is the single person I have known in the analytical tradition who comes closest to a non-naturalistic conception of phenomenology, at least and esp. when it comes to his theory of intentionality, esp., of intentional object.
1) My phenomenology* of seeing an apple is different from my phenomenology of seeing a pineapple.
2) The phenomenology** of perception is different from the phenomenology of imagination.
Obviously, phenomenology* is different from phenomenology**. The former is used in an "experiential" sense, it says only that the experiential aspects in two cases of experiences are different. While the latter states that as two complex theories or description of two different kinds of experiences, they are different. In this sense, Phenomenology** is a disciplinary subject.
So may be it would be better to substitute phenomenology* with phenomenography, or some other terms, to avoid this ambiguity. Confusion of first order things and higher order things always tends to cause trouble in philosophizing.
We can say that phenomenology** is a discipline on Phenomenology*. But of course, Phenomenology** also must have its Phenomenology**(*), because in doing phenomenology, we obviously also have a Phenomenology*, which is different from doing Mathematics or Physics. This reiteration can go further, of course.
Of course phenomenology** can also have naturalistic and non-naturalistic (not anti-naturalistic) versions. Most analytic phenomenologists in the analytical philosophy tradition has a version of naturalistic phenomenology. E.g., Charlse Siewert (2006, In Favour of Plain Phenomenology; 2007, Who is afraid of Phenomenological Disputes), as well as Susanna Siegel, etc. Tim Crane is the single person I have known in the analytical tradition who comes closest to a non-naturalistic conception of phenomenology, at least and esp. when it comes to his theory of intentionality, esp., of intentional object.
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