Friday, August 21, 2009
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Mach Bands
A simple experiment first(My Design):Focus on the picture, and then push closer or draw further from the picture with constant speed, or otherwise, see what happens! One thing I find, among others, is this: The size of the area in the middle, and the color of the outer area really seem to change, though I know they have not. This is only a phenomenon of the normal optics. But it is obvious in this case than, say, in the case of observing your computer from different distance. In this case, we have
1) sensory phenomenology.It does not appear to be the same.
2)NonSensory phenomenology. It appears to be the same, nevertheless.
The following is from plato.stanford.edu
The thin dark bands along the outer edges of the gradients and the thin light bands along the inner edges of the gradients are optical illusions. The cause of this effect is due to contrast perception; we over process at boundaries and under process where there is constancy. In fact sensory response can even stop with unchanging stimulation. Mach is credited for discovering lateral inhibition in our sense organs, the idea that our senses pre-process information before sending it to the brain.
Since every retinal point perceives itself, so to speak, as above or below the average of its neighbors, there results a characteristic type of perception. Whatever is near the mean of the surroundings becomes effaced, whatever is above or below is disproportionately brought into prominence. One could say that the retina schematizes and caricatures. The teleological significance of this process is clear in itself. It is an analog of abstraction and of the formation of concepts. [Mach 1868, in Ratliff 1965: 306]
Let us first ask how we would find our way in the visual world if we would perceive, not relations of, but only differences in, illumination. One and the same thing in the same surroundings would become immediately unrecognizable with the slightest alteration of light intensity, such as when a cloud covers the sun. Should we still want to find our way, we would then have to habituate ourselves to maintain equal levels of light intensity, for instance by closing and opening our eyes. In fact, if this god of the psychophysical law were non-existent, the organism itself would have to devise it and, if the Darwinian theory is correct, it has devised it. The seeing of light intensity relations, within certain limits, is necessary for the existence of organisms. [Mach 1868 in Ratliff 1965: 300]
From plato.stanford.edu
Monday, August 17, 2009
Saturday, August 15, 2009
Four Principles of Phenomenology
1.Consciousness has Phenomenological Features.
2.Phenomenological Constraint on Theories of Consciousness:(x)(if x is a theory of consciousness,then, it must obey the right phenomenological description of consciousness)
3. Principle of Reflexivability: (x)(if x is a phenomenological feature of consciousness, then, it is accessible to reflexion in principle)
4. Principle of Describability: (x) (if x is a phenomenolgical feature of consciousness & if it is reflected upon, then, x must be describable in principle).
This is my formulation of some principles I find in Husserl's phenomenology.
I find 1, 2,3 apparently convincing, but with regard to 3, I suspect that it is true, because the language we use does not seem to be able to describe everything we see in great details, esp. when it comes to consciousness. And unfortunately, this seems to bring some damage to the other two principles(2,3).
2.Phenomenological Constraint on Theories of Consciousness:(x)(if x is a theory of consciousness,then, it must obey the right phenomenological description of consciousness)
3. Principle of Reflexivability: (x)(if x is a phenomenological feature of consciousness, then, it is accessible to reflexion in principle)
4. Principle of Describability: (x) (if x is a phenomenolgical feature of consciousness & if it is reflected upon, then, x must be describable in principle).
This is my formulation of some principles I find in Husserl's phenomenology.
I find 1, 2,3 apparently convincing, but with regard to 3, I suspect that it is true, because the language we use does not seem to be able to describe everything we see in great details, esp. when it comes to consciousness. And unfortunately, this seems to bring some damage to the other two principles(2,3).
Husserl is the first one who uses TwinEarth Thought Experiment
Quite fanscinating:
Wie aber, wenn auf zwei Himmelskörpern zwei Menschen in völlig gleicher Umgebungserscheinung "dieselben" Gegenstände vorstellen und danach "dieselben" Aussagen orientieren? Hat das "dies" in beiden Fällen nicht eine verschiedene Bedeutung?(Hua XXVI,211-212,Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre)
My translation:
But how is it, when two people living on two planets,with entirely identical appearance of enviroments, represent the same objects, and then orient to have expression of the samething? Do not the "the" in both situations have the same meaning?
(Lectures on Theory of Meaning)
And now, guess what Husserl's Answer is!
Wie aber, wenn auf zwei Himmelskörpern zwei Menschen in völlig gleicher Umgebungserscheinung "dieselben" Gegenstände vorstellen und danach "dieselben" Aussagen orientieren? Hat das "dies" in beiden Fällen nicht eine verschiedene Bedeutung?(Hua XXVI,211-212,Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre)
My translation:
But how is it, when two people living on two planets,with entirely identical appearance of enviroments, represent the same objects, and then orient to have expression of the samething? Do not the "the" in both situations have the same meaning?
(Lectures on Theory of Meaning)
And now, guess what Husserl's Answer is!
Friday, August 14, 2009
态度
现象学态度是一种特殊的哲学态度。但是我们首先要理解什么哲学态度。为了理解，简便的方法是将其与其它态度，例如自然科学态度，联系并对照起来。在对待“什么是认知？”这个问题时，在自然科学态度下，自然科学家会在实验室里，构造各种认知环境，并通过对大脑，各种感觉器官和神经，进行经验性研究来回答。而处于哲学态度里的哲学家显然对这个问题有着不同的答案，他们甚至会对这个问题有不同的解释。例如Ingarden会认为，在哲学态度下，这是一个典型的“什么是X？”这样的问题，哲学态度就是把这类问题当作本质问题（Essentiale Fragen）来对待，因此这个问题就变成了“什么是X的本质”。[1]当然，“本质”这个词是非常可疑的哲学用语。不过，无论如何，这样的问题不会要求一个经验性的答案。当然，有些哲学家把这个问题理解为要求某种哲学分析。这个时候，对于“什么是认知？”，哲学答案可能是通过对“认知”或者“知道”做出分析来给出。例如：
(i) S知道p，当且仅当，S（1）具有信念p；（2）p为真；(3) S对p有充分的证据（或者，S相信p是得到辩护的）[2]。
这样的哲学分析是通过分析成真条件 (truth conditions)来给出的。一个完整的分析会给出充分必要条件。对于同样的问题，语言分析哲学家们可能会把这个问题理解成，什么是正确使用“S知道p”这个句子框架的充分必要条件，并给出相应的答案。
(i*) “S知道p”这个句子框架得到正确的使用，当且仅当， (1)---; (2)---;---;(n)--- 。
如果你是一个语言哲学家，那么你可能喜欢这个答案。不过，对于以上这个分析，我们也可以有一个本体论的解读，这个解读的形式可能是这样的：
(i**) S处于知道p的心灵状态m，当且仅当，(1)---; (2)---;---;(n)--- 。
很明显，处于不同态度下的主体会对同样的问题给出不同的答案。自然科学家们给出的是经验性的答案，这些答案可以通过进一步的实验而得到证伪。而哲学家们给出的答案，至少根据传统的区分和理解，则并不是经验性的答案。正确的分析被认为是先天可知的，并且甚至被认为是必然有效的。有些这样的哲学分析则可能是错误的，但是对它们的证伪一般不通过对经验事实的考察，而是通过进一步的哲学反思和分析。但是，科学家的研究结果和哲学家的分析并非没有关系的。如果在(i**)这个框架下我们提供了一个正确的分析，那么这对科学家的经验研究显然是有限制的。因为，在现实中，没有哪个心灵状态违反这个分析，却仍保持为一个相应的认知心灵状态。
当然，对于以上的说明，一个明显的反驳是这样的：这里所涉及到的不是不同的态度。 而是，他们显然对本来相同的问题进行了不同的再解读。例如，自然科学解读，哲学解读。哲学解释里又可以分为本质问题解读，语言哲学解读，本体论解读。然后，他们对这些不同的问题给出了不同的答案。但是，一个直接的回答是，原来的问题是有模糊的，所以留下了不同的解读空间。但正是不同的解读首先构成他们不同态度，其次才是给出相应的答案。
再从哲学史的角度举例，来让我们的观点更加直观一点。有些哲学家可能对某种态度有所偏爱，并把一种态度解释为另外一种态度。对于“什么是感知？”，甚至“什么是物质性事物？”这样的问题，Ayer就认为这是典型的语言分析问题，即使表面看来这是个事实性问题[1]。这也是所谓语言哲学转向之后一个比较普遍的态度。避开Ayer是否正确不谈。可以确定的是，这两个问题分别对洛克或者亚里士多德来说，并非语言分析问题。他们给出的答案，至少并不为他们设想为语言分析。这里，避开优劣不谈，我们似乎可以说，这里涉及到了不同的哲学态度。
我们列举了一些不同态度的例子，从这些例子中，对于什么构成某种特定态度，我们可以预先并非那么严格地归纳一下特征，并普遍化一下。我们可以说，一些基本的背景、预设会导致人们从不同的角度来解读甚至是一样的问题，并给出不同的答案。背景和预设，以及构成对一个问题的不同哲学解读和处理方式等，构成了某种特定的哲学态度的重要方面。这个规定当然远远不够精确和完整，但是我希望它能够初步说明我们对态度这个概念的理解。我们发现，上面列举的几种态度，都可以在自然科学和哲学的现实中找到很好的个例。
[1] 这些问题被Ingarden普遍化为：“什么是X”这样的问题，但是他和Ayer的理解显然是不一样的，见上文。Ayer的观点，参见Ayer (1971), 64-65. “‘What is the nature of a material thing?’ is, like any other question of the form, a linguistic question, being a demand for a definition. And the propositions which are set forth in answer to it are linguistic propositions, even though they may be expressed in such a way that they seem to be factual. They are propositions about the relationship of symbols, and not about the properties of the things which the symbols denote.”
Two Grammatical Jokes: We are all Naked! & Feeling Depressed
Wittgenstein:
We are all naked, underneath our clothes.
Chisholm:
I have a red book.
I have depressed feeling.
--------------------------
I have a least two things : a red book & a depressed feeling.
And we can also infer:
The book is red& The feeling is depressed.
The two sentences must be analysed differently.
We are all naked, underneath our clothes.
Chisholm:
I have a red book.
I have depressed feeling.
--------------------------
I have a least two things : a red book & a depressed feeling.
And we can also infer:
The book is red& The feeling is depressed.
The two sentences must be analysed differently.
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
What one would know if one is in a cartesian situation?
John Tienson says: A Lot!
Tienson at least provisionally endorses the assumption that
the Cartesian situation is possible. His position seems to be
this: this assumption is highly intuitive and, hence, should be
accepted so long as there is no compelling argument against it.
The considerations that are often taken to undercut this
assumption show only that successful reference requires that a
subject stand in the relevant causal relations to an external
environment. They do not show that entertaining intentional
contents requires this. Moreover, he thinks that there is a
plausible story about how narrow contents can contribute to
reference, in the proper environmental context.1 He concludes
that the assumption survives the standard externalist arguments
and that a thinker who is in the Cartesian situation will
know “plenty,” including “that he is presented with a rich,
complex, and coherent world” (Tienson, 58).
the Cartesian situation is possible. His position seems to be
this: this assumption is highly intuitive and, hence, should be
accepted so long as there is no compelling argument against it.
The considerations that are often taken to undercut this
assumption show only that successful reference requires that a
subject stand in the relevant causal relations to an external
environment. They do not show that entertaining intentional
contents requires this. Moreover, he thinks that there is a
plausible story about how narrow contents can contribute to
reference, in the proper environmental context.1 He concludes
that the assumption survives the standard externalist arguments
and that a thinker who is in the Cartesian situation will
know “plenty,” including “that he is presented with a rich,
complex, and coherent world” (Tienson, 58).
Monday, August 10, 2009
The Phenomenal and the Phenomenological
It is very common that the use of the Term "Phenomenological" is quite confusing. Consider the two typical expressions.
1) My phenomenology* of seeing an apple is different from my phenomenology of seeing a pineapple.
2) The phenomenology** of perception is different from the phenomenology of imagination.
Obviously, phenomenology* is different from phenomenology**. The former is used in an "experiential" sense, it says only that the experiential aspects in two cases of experiences are different. While the latter states that as two complex theories or description of two different kinds of experiences, they are different. In this sense, Phenomenology** is a disciplinary subject.
So may be it would be better to substitute phenomenology* with phenomenography, or some other terms, to avoid this ambiguity. Confusion of first order things and higher order things always tends to cause trouble in philosophizing.
We can say that phenomenology** is a discipline on Phenomenology*. But of course, Phenomenology** also must have its Phenomenology**(*), because in doing phenomenology, we obviously also have a Phenomenology*, which is different from doing Mathematics or Physics. This reiteration can go further, of course.
Of course phenomenology** can also have naturalistic and non-naturalistic (not anti-naturalistic) versions. Most analytic phenomenologists in the analytical philosophy tradition has a version of naturalistic phenomenology. E.g., Charlse Siewert (2006, In Favour of Plain Phenomenology; 2007, Who is afraid of Phenomenological Disputes), as well as Susanna Siegel, etc. Tim Crane is the single person I have known in the analytical tradition who comes closest to a non-naturalistic conception of phenomenology, at least and esp. when it comes to his theory of intentionality, esp., of intentional object.
1) My phenomenology* of seeing an apple is different from my phenomenology of seeing a pineapple.
2) The phenomenology** of perception is different from the phenomenology of imagination.
Obviously, phenomenology* is different from phenomenology**. The former is used in an "experiential" sense, it says only that the experiential aspects in two cases of experiences are different. While the latter states that as two complex theories or description of two different kinds of experiences, they are different. In this sense, Phenomenology** is a disciplinary subject.
So may be it would be better to substitute phenomenology* with phenomenography, or some other terms, to avoid this ambiguity. Confusion of first order things and higher order things always tends to cause trouble in philosophizing.
We can say that phenomenology** is a discipline on Phenomenology*. But of course, Phenomenology** also must have its Phenomenology**(*), because in doing phenomenology, we obviously also have a Phenomenology*, which is different from doing Mathematics or Physics. This reiteration can go further, of course.
Of course phenomenology** can also have naturalistic and non-naturalistic (not anti-naturalistic) versions. Most analytic phenomenologists in the analytical philosophy tradition has a version of naturalistic phenomenology. E.g., Charlse Siewert (2006, In Favour of Plain Phenomenology; 2007, Who is afraid of Phenomenological Disputes), as well as Susanna Siegel, etc. Tim Crane is the single person I have known in the analytical tradition who comes closest to a non-naturalistic conception of phenomenology, at least and esp. when it comes to his theory of intentionality, esp., of intentional object.
Content of Experience?
There are Alternatives about the content of sensual experience such as:
1) Sensual experiences have no content, what are there are raw feels.
2) Sensual experiences have only sensory content.
3) Sensual experiences have two part content: Qualia and a belief.
1) Sensual experiences have no content, what are there are raw feels.
2) Sensual experiences have only sensory content.
3) Sensual experiences have two part content: Qualia and a belief.
Must Causality be present in the content of perceptual experience?
John Searle's answer is "Yes". Not only it is true that causality belongs to the contents of perceptual experience, it is also argued that it is also experienced and discoverable from the first person perspective. That amounts to say:
1) When we perceive x, we do not only perceive x, under some aspects (e.g., x as such and such).
2) We also perceive x as the cause of our current perception, and this belongs to the content of this perception.
3) Upon reflection of the perception of x, we can have epistemic access to the experience of x as the cause of my perception of x.
But Searle's point seems to be dubious when it comes to 2) and 3). Shortly put, it is possible and very often that when we perceive x, we also experience x as the cause of our perception of x, and upon reflection we have access to this fact. However, this by no means suggest that for every perception, experience of causation must also be present in the entire content. I think it is not implausible that people can have perception without having a concept of causation at all. Thought experienment needs to be done, and a variation needs to be given to make this point...
So experience of causation is not a necessary condition for one to have perception. Now another question is, is it a sufficient condition?
1) When we perceive x, we do not only perceive x, under some aspects (e.g., x as such and such).
2) We also perceive x as the cause of our current perception, and this belongs to the content of this perception.
3) Upon reflection of the perception of x, we can have epistemic access to the experience of x as the cause of my perception of x.
But Searle's point seems to be dubious when it comes to 2) and 3). Shortly put, it is possible and very often that when we perceive x, we also experience x as the cause of our perception of x, and upon reflection we have access to this fact. However, this by no means suggest that for every perception, experience of causation must also be present in the entire content. I think it is not implausible that people can have perception without having a concept of causation at all. Thought experienment needs to be done, and a variation needs to be given to make this point...
So experience of causation is not a necessary condition for one to have perception. Now another question is, is it a sufficient condition?
Karl Mertens (Würzburg)
Mertens speciality lies in practical philosophy, he is one of the few Lehrstühle in Germany who has strong phenomenological (Husserlian) background.
In this september, there will be a big conference on Phenomenology in Würzburg.
In this september, there will be a big conference on Phenomenology in Würzburg.
Prof. Dr. Karl Mertens (Lehrstuhlinhaber)
Lehrstuhl II - Praktische Philosophie
Prof. Dr. Karl Mertens
Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Institut für Philosophie - Lehrstuhl II
Residenz - Südflügel
97070 Würzburg
Tel.: +49-(0)931-31-2857 (2859)
Fax: +49-(0)931-31-2855
eMail: 
Sunday, August 9, 2009
Two Harvard Analytic Phenomenologists: Sean Kelly and Susanna Siegel
Sean Kelly was a student of John Searle and Dreyfus, what a fascinating combination of teachers.
Susanna Siegel has done some very interesting work in the area of phenomenological method, esp., what counts as phenomenologically salient content. She is also a critic of the naturalistic theorists of intentional content such as Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, etc.
The two philosophers seem to make Havard one of the best places to study analytic phenomenology in the world!
So there are two analytic phenomenologists at Havard!
(1)
Susanna Siegel has done some very interesting work in the area of phenomenological method, esp., what counts as phenomenologically salient content. She is also a critic of the naturalistic theorists of intentional content such as Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, etc.
The two philosophers seem to make Havard one of the best places to study analytic phenomenology in the world!
So there are two analytic phenomenologists at Havard!
(1)
 | Professor | ||||||||
| Emerson 302 | |||||||||
| 617-495-3915 | |||||||||
| sdkelly@fas.harvard.edu | |||||||||
| http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~sdkelly | |||||||||
Sean Kelly earned an Sc.B. in Mathematics and Computer Science and an M.S. in Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences from Brown University in 1989. After several years as a graduate student in Logic and Methodology of Science, he finally received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley in 1998. He taught in Philosophy and the Humanities at Stanford and in Philosophy and Neuroscience at Princeton before joining the Harvard Faculty in 2006. His work focuses on various aspects of the philosophical, phenomenological, and cognitive neuroscientific nature of human experience. This gives him a broad forum: recent work has addressed, for example, the experience of time, the possibility of demonstrating that monkeys have blindsighted experience, and the understanding of the sacred in Homer. He has taught courses on 20th century French and German Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Perception, Imagination and Memory, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Literature. (2)
| |||||||||
Zahavi and Thomasson
Zahavi has some ambivalent thoughts about the interest from the side of analytical philosophers in phenomenology.
Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common
concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn
from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an
exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be
a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I
will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to
discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like
rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the
question of whether the current focus on the first-person perspective
might have a negative side-effect by giving us a slanted view of what
subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of
whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might
actually conceal some rather deep-rooted differences in the systematic
use these findings serve.(Zahavi 2007)
I think this attitude is quite understandable and I also share.
But there are also points that I cannot agree.
Amie Thomasson points out in her comments on Zahavi's paper, phenomenology is really better understood as transcendental if it is understood methodologically, and it really does not commit to any of the substantive views concerning the existence of the world and its relation to subjectivity. E.g., phenomenology per se, cannot give us argument concerning the real nature of the world, it does not accept, nor reject any version of idealism as it is traditionally understood. Although it might be compatible or incompatible with some of the versions.(Thomasson 2007) For example, if a version of idealism requires us to reject the structure of intentionality, which is an essential structure, then it is not compatible with the phenomenological insight, and it is therefore should be rejected on that ground. But certainly, many other versions of idealism can be perfectly compatible with phenomenological results.
But in any case, phenomenological essential insights are compatible with both idealism and realism, in the sense that it does not deny them nor accept them merely because they have the title as they do. This is not to deny, however, that it might not be compatible with some versions of them.
Again, about the status of consciousness and the world, Zahavi seems to hold that, consciousness is not on a par with the world. Surely it is not, but it would wrong to take this to be an ontological distinction, rather, this speaks out only an Epistemological Distinction, that we know our mind essentially differently from we know our minds(McCulloch 2003).
concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn
from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an
exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be
a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I
will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to
discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like
rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the
question of whether the current focus on the first-person perspective
might have a negative side-effect by giving us a slanted view of what
subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of
whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might
actually conceal some rather deep-rooted differences in the systematic
use these findings serve.(Zahavi 2007)
I think this attitude is quite understandable and I also share.
But there are also points that I cannot agree.
Amie Thomasson points out in her comments on Zahavi's paper, phenomenology is really better understood as transcendental if it is understood methodologically, and it really does not commit to any of the substantive views concerning the existence of the world and its relation to subjectivity. E.g., phenomenology per se, cannot give us argument concerning the real nature of the world, it does not accept, nor reject any version of idealism as it is traditionally understood. Although it might be compatible or incompatible with some of the versions.(Thomasson 2007) For example, if a version of idealism requires us to reject the structure of intentionality, which is an essential structure, then it is not compatible with the phenomenological insight, and it is therefore should be rejected on that ground. But certainly, many other versions of idealism can be perfectly compatible with phenomenological results.
But in any case, phenomenological essential insights are compatible with both idealism and realism, in the sense that it does not deny them nor accept them merely because they have the title as they do. This is not to deny, however, that it might not be compatible with some versions of them.
Again, about the status of consciousness and the world, Zahavi seems to hold that, consciousness is not on a par with the world. Surely it is not, but it would wrong to take this to be an ontological distinction, rather, this speaks out only an Epistemological Distinction, that we know our mind essentially differently from we know our minds(McCulloch 2003).
Philosopher of the Week: Amie Thomasson (Miami)
Amie Thomasson is really one of the finest philosophers I have seen working on an Analytic Phenomenology.
Her contributions are:
1. An interpretation of phenomenological reduction.
2.That of eidetic variation. She interprets it as a kind of conceptual analysis in the sense of Ryle.
Amie Thomasson (Ph.D., University of California-Irvine), Professor and Parodi Senior Scholar in Aesthetics. Her areas of specialization are in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and philosophy of art. She is the author of Ordinary Objects (Oxford University Press, 2007), Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and co-editor (with David W. Smith) of Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2005). In addition she has published numerous book chapters and articles on topics including metaontology, fiction, philosophy of mind and phenomenology, and the metaphysics of artifacts, works of art and other social objects. She is currently working on problems regarding modality, existence questions, and the methods of metaphysics.
Links: C.V. Publications Web Page
Her contributions are:
1. An interpretation of phenomenological reduction.
2.That of eidetic variation. She interprets it as a kind of conceptual analysis in the sense of Ryle.
Amie Thomasson (Ph.D., University of California-Irvine), Professor and Parodi Senior Scholar in Aesthetics. Her areas of specialization are in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and philosophy of art. She is the author of Ordinary Objects (Oxford University Press, 2007), Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and co-editor (with David W. Smith) of Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2005). In addition she has published numerous book chapters and articles on topics including metaontology, fiction, philosophy of mind and phenomenology, and the metaphysics of artifacts, works of art and other social objects. She is currently working on problems regarding modality, existence questions, and the methods of metaphysics.
Office: Ashe building, Rm. 701
Phone #: 305-284-5315
Email: thomasson@miami.edu
Links: C.V. Publications Web Page
Friday, August 7, 2009
Intentionality: Choice of Terminology
Literature on Intentionality is burdened by a mess of terminology. It is therefore desirable to choose and define one's terms very carefully when one writes about Intentionality.
When developing Husserl's theory of Intentionality, I think it is quite undesirable to continue to use his terminology like: Hyle, Noesis, Noema. But I should be very careful to use terms like: Content, Intentional Object, Correlate, Act, etc.
When developing Husserl's theory of Intentionality, I think it is quite undesirable to continue to use his terminology like: Hyle, Noesis, Noema. But I should be very careful to use terms like: Content, Intentional Object, Correlate, Act, etc.
Thursday, August 6, 2009
Hussserl:"Der Sinn der Wahrnehmung kann nicht abbrennen"
Consider the following sentences:
1) A mathematical form cannot burn.
2) The sense of perception cannot burn.
3) Water cannot burn.
4) This piece of wet wood cannot burn.
Now 1) and 2) have the same form as 3) and 4). But actually, 1) and 2) are either trivial (for logical and categorial reasons)or they are nonsense, whereas 3) and 4) offer important empirical information about things in the world.
The positive form of 1) "A Mathematical form can burn" is nonsensical, not because it contradicts some empirical fact, but because it abuses the meaning of "mathematical form". Therefore this sentence is nonsensical, it abuses grammar and it makes a category mistake in Ryle's and Husserl's sense. (See Husserl's example about the sense of the perception of a tree, later he comments that it is Widersinnig. See Bernet's quotation in his paper Husserls Begriff des Noema) So the negative form"--A mathematical form can burn" must also be nonsensical. Then the sentence "A mathematical form cannot burn", which is only a rephrase of the negative form must be nonsensical as well. But it seems to make sense. But if it expresses anything at all, it expresses only this :That "burn" is not something can be rightly applied to mathematical form according to their categorial form. In this way, it expresses something quite trivial, something about the use of words.
Now, I think 3) is in a position between 1),2) and 4), it expresses something emprical. Yet there is some differences here.
Consider:
5) This piece of wet wood can burn.
Makes perfect sense.
While
6) Water can burn.
is either (empirically) trivially false or makes no sense at all.
It seems to me the difference lies here, "wet wood" and some other similar things like "coal", "plastic" are the kind of things that can burn or fail to burn. If you want to know it, you need to find out empirically in each case. But in the case of "water", it seems that you can know without seeing. Then it seems to me that though "Water cannot burn" as well "Water can burn" make sense, they are quite trivial things to say. But in any case, if one says "Nonesense" to a person who says "Water can burn", I will not be suprised. If one says "Nonesense" to a person who says "This piece of wet wood can burn", then I must take him to say "It is false" not that "It is nonsensical".
1) A mathematical form cannot burn.
2) The sense of perception cannot burn.
3) Water cannot burn.
4) This piece of wet wood cannot burn.
Now 1) and 2) have the same form as 3) and 4). But actually, 1) and 2) are either trivial (for logical and categorial reasons)or they are nonsense, whereas 3) and 4) offer important empirical information about things in the world.
The positive form of 1) "A Mathematical form can burn" is nonsensical, not because it contradicts some empirical fact, but because it abuses the meaning of "mathematical form". Therefore this sentence is nonsensical, it abuses grammar and it makes a category mistake in Ryle's and Husserl's sense. (See Husserl's example about the sense of the perception of a tree, later he comments that it is Widersinnig. See Bernet's quotation in his paper Husserls Begriff des Noema) So the negative form"--A mathematical form can burn" must also be nonsensical. Then the sentence "A mathematical form cannot burn", which is only a rephrase of the negative form must be nonsensical as well. But it seems to make sense. But if it expresses anything at all, it expresses only this :That "burn" is not something can be rightly applied to mathematical form according to their categorial form. In this way, it expresses something quite trivial, something about the use of words.
Now, I think 3) is in a position between 1),2) and 4), it expresses something emprical. Yet there is some differences here.
Consider:
5) This piece of wet wood can burn.
Makes perfect sense.
While
6) Water can burn.
is either (empirically) trivially false or makes no sense at all.
It seems to me the difference lies here, "wet wood" and some other similar things like "coal", "plastic" are the kind of things that can burn or fail to burn. If you want to know it, you need to find out empirically in each case. But in the case of "water", it seems that you can know without seeing. Then it seems to me that though "Water cannot burn" as well "Water can burn" make sense, they are quite trivial things to say. But in any case, if one says "Nonesense" to a person who says "Water can burn", I will not be suprised. If one says "Nonesense" to a person who says "This piece of wet wood can burn", then I must take him to say "It is false" not that "It is nonsensical".
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Logical Geography of Concepts
Ryle and Strawson thinks that the task of philosopher is to offer a logical geography of our most important concepts. I do not doubt its sense, not at all.
But the scope of the discovery in philosophy seems to be larger than this. We do not onlyoffer a map for the already existing concepts.
I want to expand it a little bit, because there can be many mental phenomena which we still have no concepts for. This is suggested by Searle and Husserl. E.g., "background beliefs", "background presuppositions", "Retention", "Protention", etc. None of them are the concepts in our use when talking uncritically about the mind, yet they are important concepts, whose meaning determined in the process of philosophizing.
Now, this kind of thing happens always in the history of scientific discovery, why should it be any different in philosophy. It also has an real history in philosphy, the ideas of "Idea" or "Vorstellung", "Intentionalität" are simply inventions in the history of philosophy.
Hence, following the Analogy, the two aims of philosophy are:
1. To make a conceptual map for the land we have already stepped on. (Ryle, Strawson, Proper Task for Conservative Philosophers)
2. To discover the new land, name them, and then to make a conceptual map of it.(Task for More Adventurous Philosophers)
But the scope of the discovery in philosophy seems to be larger than this. We do not onlyoffer a map for the already existing concepts.
I want to expand it a little bit, because there can be many mental phenomena which we still have no concepts for. This is suggested by Searle and Husserl. E.g., "background beliefs", "background presuppositions", "Retention", "Protention", etc. None of them are the concepts in our use when talking uncritically about the mind, yet they are important concepts, whose meaning determined in the process of philosophizing.
Now, this kind of thing happens always in the history of scientific discovery, why should it be any different in philosophy. It also has an real history in philosphy, the ideas of "Idea" or "Vorstellung", "Intentionalität" are simply inventions in the history of philosophy.
Hence, following the Analogy, the two aims of philosophy are:
1. To make a conceptual map for the land we have already stepped on. (Ryle, Strawson, Proper Task for Conservative Philosophers)
2. To discover the new land, name them, and then to make a conceptual map of it.(Task for More Adventurous Philosophers)
Philosopher of the Week: Christian Beyer (Göttingen)
Endlich, ein Professor Ord., dessen Schwerpunkt in Phänomenologie liegt, und zwar in Göttingen.
Er ist noch sehr jung, 41. Ich erwarte viel von ihm.
Er verteidigt Follesdal's Interpretation Husserls Theorie der Intentionalität gegen Dan Zahavi. Ich werde eine neue Interpretation hearusarbeiten, die gründlich gegen Follesdal ist, und deswegen ist Beyer für mich noch interessanter.
Prof. Dr. Christian Beyer
http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/70428.html
Er ist noch sehr jung, 41. Ich erwarte viel von ihm.
Er verteidigt Follesdal's Interpretation Husserls Theorie der Intentionalität gegen Dan Zahavi. Ich werde eine neue Interpretation hearusarbeiten, die gründlich gegen Follesdal ist, und deswegen ist Beyer für mich noch interessanter.
Prof. Dr. Christian Beyer
http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/70428.html
Kurz-Vita
Geboren 1968; Studium der Philosophie, Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und Deutschen Sprache in Hamburg und Bielefeld; Magister Artium 1994 in Hamburg; 1994/5 Visiting Scholar in Stanford; Feb./März 1996 Assistenz in Oslo; Promotion 1999 in Hamburg; Jan.-Juni 2000 Temporary Lecturer in Philosophy in Sheffield; 2000-2005 wiss. Mitarbeiter in Erfurt; Habilitation 2004; 2005-2007 Heisenberg-Stipendiat der DFG; WS 2007/8 Berufung auf eine Professur für Theoretische Philosophie an der Universität Göttingen.
Schwerpunkte in Forschung und Lehre
Sprachphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes einschließlich der Philosophie der Person, Erkenntnistheorie, Phänomenologie (insbesondere Husserl).
Veröffentlichungen (Auswahl)
- Von Bolzano zu Husserl - Eine Untersuchung über den Ursprung der phänomenologischen Bedeutungslehre. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996.
- Intentionalität und Referenz - Eine sprachanalytische Studie zu Husserls transzendentaler Phänomenologie. Paderborn: mentis 2000.
- Subjektivität, Intersubjektivität, Personalität - Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie der Person. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 2006.
- (Als Herausgeber, zusammen mit Alex Burri:) Philosophical Knowledge - Its Possibility and Scope. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2007.
The Excitement of Philosophy and Tim Crane, Husserl
I think my excitement in philosophy basically has the following aspects:
1. To see how an excellent argument, a description, a theory can be clearly, powerfully presented.
2.To see how they can be right.
3. Also, it is very exciting to see how they are wrong.
The most painful thing in philosophical reading is that the text is so confusing that you cannot tell if it is right or wrong, despite my best effort.
I am reading Follesdals reinterpretation of Husserl's theory of intentionality, actulally, re-reading. I now believe no part of it, and I think I have found the mistakes in it, and I have a new interpretation to offer.
Strangely enough, I also find the person who is closet to Husserl is Tim Crane in the analytic tradition. I have read many (most) of Tim Crane's publications, and none of the central ideas are fundamentally different from Husserl's. Among which:
1. Intentional Object are just an Object which our thoughts direct. It has no substantial Nature. Therefore, this concept is an ontologically neutral concept.
2. The general structure of Intentionality.
3.The idea that the problem of intentionality is deeper than the problem of language. The order of explanation should be from intentionality to language, not other way around. This idea, I think, is also the idea of Searle. Philosophy of Language is a branch of Philosophy of Mind. Although, iterations can occur. Philosophy of Mind is a branch of philosophy of language, philosophy of language of mind. Yet, there can be other way around.
1. To see how an excellent argument, a description, a theory can be clearly, powerfully presented.
2.To see how they can be right.
3. Also, it is very exciting to see how they are wrong.
The most painful thing in philosophical reading is that the text is so confusing that you cannot tell if it is right or wrong, despite my best effort.
I am reading Follesdals reinterpretation of Husserl's theory of intentionality, actulally, re-reading. I now believe no part of it, and I think I have found the mistakes in it, and I have a new interpretation to offer.
Strangely enough, I also find the person who is closet to Husserl is Tim Crane in the analytic tradition. I have read many (most) of Tim Crane's publications, and none of the central ideas are fundamentally different from Husserl's. Among which:
1. Intentional Object are just an Object which our thoughts direct. It has no substantial Nature. Therefore, this concept is an ontologically neutral concept.
2. The general structure of Intentionality.
3.The idea that the problem of intentionality is deeper than the problem of language. The order of explanation should be from intentionality to language, not other way around. This idea, I think, is also the idea of Searle. Philosophy of Language is a branch of Philosophy of Mind. Although, iterations can occur. Philosophy of Mind is a branch of philosophy of language, philosophy of language of mind. Yet, there can be other way around.
Monday, August 3, 2009
Phe Idealism as an answer to a Phe Question
Idealism is an answer to Phe Question.
What is the World and Physical thing, if answered from a phenomenological point of view?
The question should be reformulated as: What is the modes of givenness of physical thing in consciousness? Or what are the conscious moments that are conscious of the physical thing as a physical thing.
And, consequently:
Epistemological: Such and such is evident, and they display such and such a structure to consciousness.
Contitutional: The answer is that it is the result of constitution of mind.
But this cannot be realistically interpreted, because this is first to interpret the question, and then the answer in a wrong way. And no wonder people will find this kind of idealism uninteresting.
Almost all of the realistic interpreters cannot grasp what is a proper Phe question to ask, and then they misinterpret and misconceive the answer to this question.
The way to misunderstand can be the following:
Phe Idealism is an answer to a unmodified realistic question.
But actually one should see:
Phe answer is the answer to the special Phe question.
And this is not to deny, as a special answer, it can have general implications for other questions.
I accept:
1. Phenomenological direct realism and externalism.
2. Phenomenological transcendental idealism.
3. 1 is a consequence of 2.
What is the World and Physical thing, if answered from a phenomenological point of view?
The question should be reformulated as: What is the modes of givenness of physical thing in consciousness? Or what are the conscious moments that are conscious of the physical thing as a physical thing.
And, consequently:
Epistemological: Such and such is evident, and they display such and such a structure to consciousness.
Contitutional: The answer is that it is the result of constitution of mind.
But this cannot be realistically interpreted, because this is first to interpret the question, and then the answer in a wrong way. And no wonder people will find this kind of idealism uninteresting.
Almost all of the realistic interpreters cannot grasp what is a proper Phe question to ask, and then they misinterpret and misconceive the answer to this question.
The way to misunderstand can be the following:
Phe Idealism is an answer to a unmodified realistic question.
But actually one should see:
Phe answer is the answer to the special Phe question.
And this is not to deny, as a special answer, it can have general implications for other questions.
I accept:
1. Phenomenological direct realism and externalism.
2. Phenomenological transcendental idealism.
3. 1 is a consequence of 2.
Saturday, August 1, 2009
Phe Results are Reproducible and Corrigilble
1. Phenomenological Results are reproducible and not incorrigible (Hua 3, 222)
2.Eidetic Analysis can have forms in Psychological and phenomenological forms.(Hua 3, 222)
3. I do not have the naive belief that by believing that a presentation of method can be worked out before we work on substantial issues, somehow you have to presuppose the knowledge of the kind of things or concepts you are going to explain and clarify.
Somehow, we use not so clear concepts to begin our philosophizing, in the process of formulating the mothod, we use this concepts. Then, as our tools get sharper, we use it to criticise the concepts we vaguely have and to produce a more powerful theory.
4. E.g., we somehow have a concept of analysis, and we use our power to analyse the phenomena of analysis. Then we get more and more insights concerning this concept, or whatsoever. Circular, yes, but necessary.
This circle is inevitable, because, insofar as we are philosophizing about the mind, we are carrying out mental performance, with a method, this method belongs to the performance of mind, and therefore some fundamental concepts which belong to the realm of the mental is unavoidable. And therefore one cannot display a proper method for the investigation of mind and knowledge without referring to the concepts one is ready to analyse.
Philosophy as a whole moves in a Zickzack Fashion. We presuppose the knowledge of the thing we are going to study, and this is no problem.
(Holistic? Yes! Neurath Boat? Gilbert Ryle and John Searle)
5.But you see, we have to start somewhere, and I think Method is a great place to start. For the following reasons:...to be continued
2.Eidetic Analysis can have forms in Psychological and phenomenological forms.(Hua 3, 222)
3. I do not have the naive belief that by believing that a presentation of method can be worked out before we work on substantial issues, somehow you have to presuppose the knowledge of the kind of things or concepts you are going to explain and clarify.
Somehow, we use not so clear concepts to begin our philosophizing, in the process of formulating the mothod, we use this concepts. Then, as our tools get sharper, we use it to criticise the concepts we vaguely have and to produce a more powerful theory.
4. E.g., we somehow have a concept of analysis, and we use our power to analyse the phenomena of analysis. Then we get more and more insights concerning this concept, or whatsoever. Circular, yes, but necessary.
This circle is inevitable, because, insofar as we are philosophizing about the mind, we are carrying out mental performance, with a method, this method belongs to the performance of mind, and therefore some fundamental concepts which belong to the realm of the mental is unavoidable. And therefore one cannot display a proper method for the investigation of mind and knowledge without referring to the concepts one is ready to analyse.
Philosophy as a whole moves in a Zickzack Fashion. We presuppose the knowledge of the thing we are going to study, and this is no problem.
(Holistic? Yes! Neurath Boat? Gilbert Ryle and John Searle)
5.But you see, we have to start somewhere, and I think Method is a great place to start. For the following reasons:...to be continued
Summer School on Phenomenology in Koeln 24-29, Juli.
1. I have met some friends there.
2. I become more convinced of what I am doing.
3. I have learned new things.
A comment about Lohmar's style of lecturing.
Really clear and persuasive. I think it is an art to find the appropriate example to illustrate the point one wants to make. And Lohmar is a master of it.
My philosophical Heros are:
Aristotle, Kant, Husserl, Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Locke...
2. I become more convinced of what I am doing.
3. I have learned new things.
A comment about Lohmar's style of lecturing.
Really clear and persuasive. I think it is an art to find the appropriate example to illustrate the point one wants to make. And Lohmar is a master of it.
My philosophical Heros are:
Aristotle, Kant, Husserl, Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Locke...
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Reinach on Hume's Principle
Reinach thinks that Hume's principle that impression has corresponding ideas, and ideas presupposes impression are a priori principles(Was is Phänomenologie, 64).
These two principles happen to be important for phenomenologists too, in some sense: all forms of consciousness are either themselves ideas, or they must presuppose ideas.
And I think this is quite right.
These two principles happen to be important for phenomenologists too, in some sense: all forms of consciousness are either themselves ideas, or they must presuppose ideas.
And I think this is quite right.
Saturday, July 25, 2009
Ryle and Ingarden
When Ryle was a young man (1927) 27, he publishes a review in Mind on Roman Ingarden's (1893-1970) essay "Essentiale Fragen", published in 1927. It is an interesting fact, though. At that time, it shows that Gilbert Ryle is quite familiar with phenomenological tradition.
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Dummett
I decide that Dummett must play a role in my essay.
A Review is written by Barry Smith, which defends:
1.Husserl's account of Intentionality.
2. The Primacy of Intentional Analysis over Linguistic Analysis. (Shared by Husserl, Searle, Chisholm, etc)
A Review is written by Barry Smith, which defends:
1.Husserl's account of Intentionality.
2. The Primacy of Intentional Analysis over Linguistic Analysis. (Shared by Husserl, Searle, Chisholm, etc)
Part-Whole Analysis as Method
Part-Whole Analysis does not only offer a substantial theory (that of Formal Ontology, according to one interpretation), it also offers a Method for Analysis. This view is accepted by: Sokolowski, Monhanty (2008), John Drummond(2002, 37), D. W. Smith (2002,64).
Someone doubts its central place in Husserl as a Method (Lohmar), and one is rightly to doubt because Part-Whole Analysis is impossilbe with still more fundamental analysis, i.e., Eidetic Variation. P-W analysis must presuppose the method of Eidetic Variation, implicitly or explicitly. The reason for this claim is that, the very essential distinction between Part and Whole, and different kinds of Parts and Wholes must be made essentially by reference to essential intuition, i.e., Eidetic Variation.
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
The Historical Development of Phe Method
1. Intentional Analysis
2.Phe Reduction
3. Eidetic Variation
But Actually, all of them are somewhat interrelated methods. Eidetic Variation and Phe Reduction are all somewhat implicitly in Intentional Analysis.
2.Phe Reduction
3. Eidetic Variation
But Actually, all of them are somewhat interrelated methods. Eidetic Variation and Phe Reduction are all somewhat implicitly in Intentional Analysis.
Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology
1.The ideas of phenomenology has naturalized versions in Analytic Philosophy of Mind.
2. Gilbert Ryle, John Searle are but two prominent examples of analytic philosophy of mind who has parellel theories to Husserl. One focuses on Methodological Dimension, the latter both.
3. Tim Crane has exactly the same ideas as Husserl.
My complain: 1.Naturalized.2.Unsystematic.3.Overlooking Phenomenological Dimension.
2. Gilbert Ryle, John Searle are but two prominent examples of analytic philosophy of mind who has parellel theories to Husserl. One focuses on Methodological Dimension, the latter both.
3. Tim Crane has exactly the same ideas as Husserl.
My complain: 1.Naturalized.2.Unsystematic.3.Overlooking Phenomenological Dimension.
Semantic Category in Tarski, Gilbert Ryle and Husserl
The Test presented by Tarski to distinguish Semantic Categories is:
The Substitution Test.
This is mentioned by Mohanty.
This Test is closely followed by Gilbert Ryle in his theory of Categories and Category Mistake.
But, this is a theory-test developed by Husserl, every bit of it!
The Substitution Test.
This is mentioned by Mohanty.
This Test is closely followed by Gilbert Ryle in his theory of Categories and Category Mistake.
But, this is a theory-test developed by Husserl, every bit of it!
The Method and the Subject
Now, suppose my subject is Knowledge.
My Method requires that I know something about knowledge already. Otherwise, how I am going to know whether my analysis is a good analysis.
One cannot clarify what is not there, because it is not there.
One cannot clarify without knowing something he is to clarify.
If one does not know anything about Knowledge, what is it to know something. How can we expect one can present us a conception out of nowhere?
My Method requires that I know something about knowledge already. Otherwise, how I am going to know whether my analysis is a good analysis.
One cannot clarify what is not there, because it is not there.
One cannot clarify without knowing something he is to clarify.
If one does not know anything about Knowledge, what is it to know something. How can we expect one can present us a conception out of nowhere?
Examples Used in Analysis
When I need to give Example of "Essences", I can give the following example:
1. Intentional Essence, Epistemic Essence.
Now the first group of investigation is a peculiar thing to do, as it must already presuppose the following:
a) One must have a way to clarify things, to make distinctions.
b)But this requires one to have an idea what is a GOOD and adequate Analysis.
c) This requires one to have a kind of KNOWLEDGE. But this requires one to know what Count as Knowledge. But this requires one to have a conception of EPISTEMIC ESSENCE at first.
d)Therefore, one employs the standard and concepts one is ready to clarify, in order to clarify the to be clarified concepts.
This is like this: When one anylyses the concept of INTENTIONALITY, one must always use intentional concepts.
When one writes about Knowledge, one must know what counts as Knowledge.
Do I PRESUPPOSE a true understanding before I start clarify? If this is so, what is the point to clarify?
Is this circular? Maybe, but what is the problem with Circularity?
I have the particular conception. Though not clearly and systematically.
What is the difference before and after the Clarification.
a. Clarity is Obtained.
b. Before that, I use somewhat not so sharp tool to analyze a concept. In the process, our concept gets clearer and our tool gets sharper.
c.I must already have some conception of Knowledge, among other things. I use this conception, to get a clearer conception, and this clearer conception is now in my reserve. It becomes a useful tool.
The Same Can be said about Intentionaltiy. Eidetic Method.
2.Essence of Perception, and Imagination as founded form of Consciousness
3. Essence of Material Thing.
4. Essence of Dependent and Independent Parts, considered purely formally.
1. Intentional Essence, Epistemic Essence.
Now the first group of investigation is a peculiar thing to do, as it must already presuppose the following:
a) One must have a way to clarify things, to make distinctions.
b)But this requires one to have an idea what is a GOOD and adequate Analysis.
c) This requires one to have a kind of KNOWLEDGE. But this requires one to know what Count as Knowledge. But this requires one to have a conception of EPISTEMIC ESSENCE at first.
d)Therefore, one employs the standard and concepts one is ready to clarify, in order to clarify the to be clarified concepts.
This is like this: When one anylyses the concept of INTENTIONALITY, one must always use intentional concepts.
When one writes about Knowledge, one must know what counts as Knowledge.
Do I PRESUPPOSE a true understanding before I start clarify? If this is so, what is the point to clarify?
Is this circular? Maybe, but what is the problem with Circularity?
I have the particular conception. Though not clearly and systematically.
What is the difference before and after the Clarification.
a. Clarity is Obtained.
b. Before that, I use somewhat not so sharp tool to analyze a concept. In the process, our concept gets clearer and our tool gets sharper.
c.I must already have some conception of Knowledge, among other things. I use this conception, to get a clearer conception, and this clearer conception is now in my reserve. It becomes a useful tool.
The Same Can be said about Intentionaltiy. Eidetic Method.
2.Essence of Perception, and Imagination as founded form of Consciousness
3. Essence of Material Thing.
4. Essence of Dependent and Independent Parts, considered purely formally.
The phenomenological Transformation of Philosophical Question
The question: What is a representation? Becomes a phenomenological question, whose proper form is:
What kind of Intentional Analysis can we give for the concept of REPRESENTATION.
Klärung der Grundbegriffe.
Klärung und Scheidung der vielen Psychologie, Erkennistheorie und Logik ganz und gar verwrirrenden Begriffe, die das Wort Vorstellung angenommen hat, ist eine wichtige Aufgabe...
Husserl uses a method of Intentional Analysis to clarify the basic concepts. Which are quite CONFUSED concepts.
Analyse der Begriffe: Zickzack Weise
descriptive Fixierung der erschauten Wesen in reinen Begriffen (Hua XIX 23)
WESEN-WESENSGESETZTE
Analytische Untersuchungen.
What kind of Intentional Analysis can we give for the concept of REPRESENTATION.
Klärung der Grundbegriffe.
Klärung und Scheidung der vielen Psychologie, Erkennistheorie und Logik ganz und gar verwrirrenden Begriffe, die das Wort Vorstellung angenommen hat, ist eine wichtige Aufgabe...
Husserl uses a method of Intentional Analysis to clarify the basic concepts. Which are quite CONFUSED concepts.
Analyse der Begriffe: Zickzack Weise
descriptive Fixierung der erschauten Wesen in reinen Begriffen (Hua XIX 23)
WESEN-WESENSGESETZTE
Analytische Untersuchungen.
Husserls Concept of Analysis
Die analytische Phänomenologie, deren der Logiker zu seinem vorbereitenden und grundlegenden Geschäfte bedarf, betrifft unter anderem und zunächst "Vorstellung" und des näheren ausdrückliche Vorstellung,. In diesen Komplexionen aber gehört sein primäres Interesse den an den "bloßen Ausdrücken" haftenden, in der Funktion der Bedeutungsintention oder Bedeutungserfüllung stehenden Erlebnissen. Indessen wird auch die sinnlichsprachliche Seite der Komplexionen und die Weise ihrer Verknüpfung mit dem beseelenden Bedeuten nicht ausser Acht bleiben dürfen...
Bedeutungsanalyse.(Intentionale Analyse)..Grammatische Analyse.
....das Verhältnis von Ausdruck und Bedeutung zu ANALYTISCHER KLARHEIT zu bringen und in dem "Rückgang von dem vagen Bedeuten zu dem ensprechenden artikulierten, klaren, mit der Fülle exemplarischer Anschauung gestättigten und sich daran erfüllenden Bedeuten das Mittel zu erkenen, wodurch die Frage, ob eine Unterscheidung als logische oder als bloß grammatiche zu gelten habe, in jedem gegebenen Falle entschieden werden kann.
Bedeutungsanalyse.(Intentionale Analyse)..Grammatische Analyse.
....das Verhältnis von Ausdruck und Bedeutung zu ANALYTISCHER KLARHEIT zu bringen und in dem "Rückgang von dem vagen Bedeuten zu dem ensprechenden artikulierten, klaren, mit der Fülle exemplarischer Anschauung gestättigten und sich daran erfüllenden Bedeuten das Mittel zu erkenen, wodurch die Frage, ob eine Unterscheidung als logische oder als bloß grammatiche zu gelten habe, in jedem gegebenen Falle entschieden werden kann.
Monday, July 20, 2009
Analytic Phenomenology
1.One should see the analytic method in application.
2.One should maintain that it is Phenomenological.
While in most of the book length essay none of the two principles are followed.
2.One should maintain that it is Phenomenological.
While in most of the book length essay none of the two principles are followed.
Outline for General Introduction
0. General Introduction: The Idea of Analytic Phenomenology
1. Husserl’s Concept of Philosophy (Moore, P. F. Strawson, Ayer and Husserl)
i. Philosophy
ii. Phenomenology and its Method (Reduction and Phenomena, Reflection, Essential Analysis and Description, Double Purity)
2. The Nature of the Analytic Phenomenology
i. Transcendental: (1) Critical: Phenomenological Transformation (2) Constitution. Philosophical.
ii. A Priori, Analytic: (1) Analytic Technique. Analytical
3. The Task of this Essay
i. Method
ii. Intentionality
iii. Knowledge
1. Husserl’s Concept of Philosophy (Moore, P. F. Strawson, Ayer and Husserl)
i. Philosophy
ii. Phenomenology and its Method (Reduction and Phenomena, Reflection, Essential Analysis and Description, Double Purity)
2. The Nature of the Analytic Phenomenology
i. Transcendental: (1) Critical: Phenomenological Transformation (2) Constitution. Philosophical.
ii. A Priori, Analytic: (1) Analytic Technique. Analytical
3. The Task of this Essay
i. Method
ii. Intentionality
iii. Knowledge
Stein Die Unfehlbarkeit der Wesensanschauung
Hua XXV, 246-248. Die Mathematik übt es über zweitausend Jahren. In der Begriffsbildung aller Wissenschaften hat es seine Rolle gespielt, ohne dass man sich darüber klar war. Nun ist es zur Klarheit gebracht, von allen Vermengungen befreit und methodisch ausgebildet werden...
Double Purity: Pure Phenomena and Pure Intuition of Essence
Hua XXV,112.
Doppelte Reinheit: die der transzendentalen Reduktion, die ihr ausschlisslich eigen ist, und die der eidetischen Intuition, die sie mit der reinen Geometrie gemein hat.
Also jeder phänomenologische Satz drückt inen Wesenszusammenhang aus und damit eine unbedingt gültige Gesetzmäßigkeit möglicher transzendentaler Phänomene überhaupt, die under den begrifflich fixierten Wesen stehen.
Doppelte Reinheit: die der transzendentalen Reduktion, die ihr ausschlisslich eigen ist, und die der eidetischen Intuition, die sie mit der reinen Geometrie gemein hat.
Also jeder phänomenologische Satz drückt inen Wesenszusammenhang aus und damit eine unbedingt gültige Gesetzmäßigkeit möglicher transzendentaler Phänomene überhaupt, die under den begrifflich fixierten Wesen stehen.
Something about Ayer
At a party that same year held by fashion designer Fernando Sanchez, Ayer, then 77, confronted Mike Tyson harassing the (then little-known) model Naomi Campbell. When Ayer demanded that Tyson stop, the boxer said: "Do you know who the fuck I am? I'm the heavyweight champion of the world," to which Ayer replied: "And I am the former Wykeham Professor of Logic. We are both pre-eminent in our field. I suggest that we talk about this like rational men".[5] Ayer and Tyson then began to talk, while Naomi Campbell slipped out.
Reformulation of Philosophical Questions
Es ist leicht nachzuweisen, dass erst auf dem Boden des phänomenologisch reinen Bewusstseins und im Rahmen einer reinen Phänomenologie alle vernunfttheoretischen Probleme wissenschaftlich streng formuliert und dann in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhang wirklich glöst werden.(Hua XXV, 80)
This might seem quite pretentious on Husserl's part. But it is no more pretentious than Ayer's Project or the project of linguistic analysis.Remember, Ayer thinks that all of the analytical philosophers are doing linguistic analysis. When someone asks the question: What is perception? The question really asked is about the use of language.
Ayer: "What is the nature of a material thing? is, like any other question of the form, a linguistic question, being a demand for a definition. And the propositions which are set forth in answer to it are linguistic propositions, even though they may be expressed in such a way that they seem to be factual. They are propositions about the relationship of symbols, and not about the properties of the things which the symbols denote" (Language Truth and Logic, 64-65)
Well, you just replace "LINGUISTIC" with "PHENOMENOLOGICAL", "DEFINITION" with "DESCRIPTION", "SYMBOLS" with "PHENOMENA" Then I think you get a parallel characterization of PHENOMENOLOGY.
That is, all philosophical questions must be formulated in the linguistic philosophical way. All of the real philosophical questions are questions concerning the use of language, or meaning, grammar of language.
This might seem quite pretentious on Husserl's part. But it is no more pretentious than Ayer's Project or the project of linguistic analysis.Remember, Ayer thinks that all of the analytical philosophers are doing linguistic analysis. When someone asks the question: What is perception? The question really asked is about the use of language.
Ayer: "What is the nature of a material thing? is, like any other question of the form, a linguistic question, being a demand for a definition. And the propositions which are set forth in answer to it are linguistic propositions, even though they may be expressed in such a way that they seem to be factual. They are propositions about the relationship of symbols, and not about the properties of the things which the symbols denote" (Language Truth and Logic, 64-65)
Well, you just replace "LINGUISTIC" with "PHENOMENOLOGICAL", "DEFINITION" with "DESCRIPTION", "SYMBOLS" with "PHENOMENA" Then I think you get a parallel characterization of PHENOMENOLOGY.
That is, all philosophical questions must be formulated in the linguistic philosophical way. All of the real philosophical questions are questions concerning the use of language, or meaning, grammar of language.
Friday, July 17, 2009
What DIFFERENCE does it make!
One can:
1.Argue against all the old objections? Though in some kind of new way?
2.Organize all the old arguments? Then it becomes systematic?
3. Offers a new interpretation of someone's ideas?
En, not so exciting!What great DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?
To philosohize requires a lot of repetition,and it seldom comes to great originality, but one cannot deem my work worthwhile when it has nothing original to offer.
So, what can your idea make a DIFFERENCE. This is a real question.
1.Argue against all the old objections? Though in some kind of new way?
2.Organize all the old arguments? Then it becomes systematic?
3. Offers a new interpretation of someone's ideas?
En, not so exciting!What great DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?
To philosohize requires a lot of repetition,and it seldom comes to great originality, but one cannot deem my work worthwhile when it has nothing original to offer.
So, what can your idea make a DIFFERENCE. This is a real question.
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