About Me

I am a PhD student in Philosophy at Peking University, now staying at Universität zu Köln, Germany. My interests are primarily in Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology and Analytic Phenomenology. Now I am working on my Dissertation: Method, Intentionality, and Knowledge--An essay in analytic phenomenology. --------- I also have substantial interest in Early Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy and Ethics.

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Evidence and Interpretation

Now (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n) are under interpretation in both cases, but e.1 counts as an evidence for That woman is beautiful if one has the original intentional state, and it counts as an evidence for That wax woman is nice if one has the modified intentional state. E.1 does not intrinsically count for or against B1 and B2, it is apprehended as evidence for either B1 or B2. Therefore, E.1 needs a moment of interpretation, apprehension.

But if singularly it is the case for E1, it is reasonable to doubt it is also the case for a set of evidences from e.1 to e.n, e.1 to e.n do not intrinsically count or against B1 or B2, only the situation becomes more complex. In this case we have constitution, a modified form of simple apprehnsion? But of course this is an extreme exageration.

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