About Me

I am a PhD student in Philosophy at Peking University, now staying at Universität zu Köln, Germany. My interests are primarily in Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology and Analytic Phenomenology. Now I am working on my Dissertation: Method, Intentionality, and Knowledge--An essay in analytic phenomenology. --------- I also have substantial interest in Early Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy and Ethics.

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Fulfilling Condition

Suppose S originally has the belief: B1.That is a woman.
First personally, the possible perceptual evidences (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n) will be fulfilling for the original intentional state.
Now, consider there emerges an evidence e.n+1, which says that the material of the seen figure is wax. Then the original belief changes into: B2.That is a wax woman. Now, under this new belief, (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n) certainly counts as evidences for B2, or they have different interpretations now.

1. Are the evidences (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n) really fulfilling toward B1, or B2? The answers can be one the following: let F be the relation of fulfillment. "B1&B2.F. (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n), B1 or B2.F. (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n) .B1or-B2.F. (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n), -B1&B2.F. (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n), B1&-B2.F. (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n), -B1&-B2.F. (e.1, e.2, e.3,....e.n), etc. I think the answer is that they are fulfilling toward both B1 and B2, but they are not exclusively fulfilling for either of them. Even in the case where one has a false belief, it is perfectly sensible to say one has fulfilling evidences, even though these evidences might precielsely be the reason why one has that false belief.

This explains the possible oscillation between B1 and B2, but not the oscillation between B1, B2, and B3 and B4: That is a man. &That is a wax man.

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