Husserl and Intentionality

Smith&McIntrye's book Husserl and Intentionality is a very systematic book on Husserl's conception of Intentionality, and it ammounts to an interesting interpretation. But this book dissatisfies me as a book in phenomenology. 1.It does not seem to be phenomenological at all except the views are from the books that are called phenomenological. 2.I think we need a methodological introduction to a thesis on intentionality, as in the case of Mohanty's book.

By contrast, though Searle's book on Intentionality is not phenomenological, but analytical, it has obvious methodological presuppositions which are taken for granted in the analytical community, i.e. the method of Gilbert Ryle and Austin. Nevertheless, he has written something about the difference between intentional analysis and linguistic analysis. Intentional analysis can also be called phenomenological analysis, if you like the terminology.

Precisely, what primarily makes Husserl's theory different from Searle's theory is their methodological committment, firstly and mostly, the suspension of natural attitude and the turn to phenomena. Secondly and secondarily, the distinction between analysis and eidetic analysis of phenomena, but actually, I do not see them as essentially different, they can be seen as constituting the same method.