About Me

I am a PhD student in Philosophy at Peking University, now staying at Universität zu Köln, Germany. My interests are primarily in Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology and Analytic Phenomenology. Now I am working on my Dissertation: Method, Intentionality, and Knowledge--An essay in analytic phenomenology. --------- I also have substantial interest in Early Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy and Ethics.

Saturday, August 30, 2008

A dialogue about movies

In H.A

S.T: I think Kubrik's film The Clockwork Orange is a great one. It tells something deep about morality. Alex, after the psychological treatment, does not become a good person, though he gets sick and throws out whenever he does something evil or bad, or when he sees something evil or bad. Alex can not even bear the sight of evil things not because he has some kind of conscience or consciousness of morality, but simply because, after the psychological treatment, the physical reaction to something bad is an effect. It is so to say, a physical stimuli-response.

R.L: Yes, the person who has some conscience will also not endure morally bad things, and it is supposed to be different from the situation of Alex's. Alex is conditioned purely physically, and he then is supposed to have no conscience. But to be physically conditioned can not be the reason why we do not take him to be a morally conscious person. Because, if the all the facts are physical, and as human beings, we are physical, then our conscience is also somehow physically conditioned. The only difference might be that the causal chain of this conscience is relatively NORMAL and complicated. So the difference between Alex and morally conscious person does not in the causality, but in the Normality of the causality.

No comments: