About Me

I am a PhD student in Philosophy at Peking University, now staying at Universität zu Köln, Germany. My interests are primarily in Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology and Analytic Phenomenology. Now I am working on my Dissertation: Method, Intentionality, and Knowledge--An essay in analytic phenomenology. --------- I also have substantial interest in Early Modern Philosophy, Political Philosophy and Ethics.

Monday, September 29, 2008

Intentionality, Philosophical Logic

Vielleicht das einbisschen trivial ist, aber was ich sagen möchte ist das, dass eine systematische Interpretation und Darstellung Husserlscher(vielleicht nicht Husserls) philosophischen Logik sinnvoll und notwendig ist. Es wäre auch schön, wenn man auch die gegenwärtige Logic und philosophische Logik (Strawson und Quine, z.B)berücksichtigen. Ein solches Projekt würde deswegen auch Kenntnisse von gegenwärtigen Diskussionen in analytischer Philosohie benötigen.

Intentionality and Logic

Whether and how Idealities are somehow apprehended by consciousness is a issue which has been discussed for a long time. The works of Mohanty, McIntrye, Hinnttika, Follesdal on Husserl is of course insigtful. However, they do not offer a Systematic account about genesis of logic.

Now if the progress should be made, then it should be made by a project that SYSTEMATICALLY works out the logical origination of the core of our logic, the predicate logic: its elements, rules of formation, and rules of transformation. And, modalities of judgments should be also considered, hence, modal logic should be also taken into this account.

The clarification of the nature of logic and its relation to consciousness were worked out in the earlier works and through Husserl's Auseinandersetzung with his contemporaries, Frege, Brentano, etc.

However, the more systematic work belongs to the later stage, in his Formale und Transzendentale Logik, Erfahrung und Urteil, Passiv Synthese, etc. Here, the meaning of subject, individual being, its properties, relations, modalities were worked out in a systematic way. Scholars often characterize this stage as genetic phenomenology, true, but one should add it was a stage of genetic phenomenology about the systematic presentation of genesis of logic. Here the genesis should be understood as a genesis from transcendental subjectivity in a somewhat Kantian sense.

At the first stage, the difference between Husserl and Frege is of course already obvious. However, it's only after the fuller discovery of the both figures that we see the entire difference. Frege's systematic work is somewhat premature, he has a Begriffschrift before he has philosophical clarification for his system, his philosophical logic comes later than his Begriffschrift. Husserl's systematic work comes later than his philosophical clarification of concepts, and his system is also a system of clarification of logical concepts in terms of intentionality and constitution, not a formal language. His systematic work is primarily in the realm of philosophical logic rather than formal logic.

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