Description of the Blog

I will share casual thoughts of mine here, primarily about philosophy.

Analysis Phenomenological Style

DEFINITION OF DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY: Ein unmittelbares Stück des Ganzen unterscheidet sich in der Weise der Explikation vom unmittelbaren unselbständigen Moment, und letzteres ist immer und notwendig „Eigenschaft“. Wir können Eigenschaft auch definieren als unmittelbares unselbständiges Moment eines Ganzen, oder als einen unmittelbaren Teil eines Ganzen, der neben sich im Ganzen keine unmittelbaren Teile hat, mit denen er „verbunden“ wäre.

COMMENT: I think this is how an analysis of Concepts and Phenomena is made through Phenomenological Description of the Gegebenheitsweise. Phenomenological analysis, in this sense, is to describe complex phenomena in simpler phenomena, as they present to consciousness. Of course this is not analysis by exact definition in terms of simpler concepts; nevertheless an exact definition of different concepts and phenomena is often the result. Different conceptions of Property are not only distinguished here, the definitions are also offered at the end, what is more, the whole process of Phenomenological Demonstration is Intuitively in order. His system can be formalized if you like, but this only involves part of the power it has. See, Kit Fine, Gilbert Null, Barry Smith, Peter Simons

Intentionality, perception, logical structure

“Logical structure” penetrates perception. As long as we perceive, even in a very primitive stage, intentionality functions in a structured way. The phenomena of “Certainty”, “Negation”, “Conjunction”, “Disjunction” and “Modality” can already be found at this primitive level.

However, at this level, it cannot be said that the experience is already “conceptual”, as it does not makes use of any concepts, such as “one”, “another”, “being”, “not”, “and”, “or” and “possible”, nevertheless it is “logical” in a sense. Whether experience should have all of the forms is an open question, however, it is beyond doubt that without the structure, experience is not possible at all.

The conditional, i.e., “if…then…” structure is somewhat complicated, because it originates from a somewhat complicated form of intentionality: protention, expectation.

However, the structure of Subject and Predicate, i.e., F(x), in predicate logic is a perhaps only a special example of pure logic which has something to do with our specific form of (temporal-spatially embodied) consciousness.

All the similar and identical features of various languages can be explained in a philosophy of mind which deals descriptively with intentionality. The privilege of this approach is that it explains the universal structure of language via descriptions of intentionality, and it does not have to make use of transcendental arguments to argue for the truth of some kind of a priori structure. It has great explanatory power as well as intuitiveness of demonstration.

Philosophy of language and philosophy of logic are branches of philosophy of mind. And insofar as philosophy of mind concerns itself with consciousness, it concerns with the universal structure of consciousness, i.e., intentionality.

The Measure

The idea is horrifying:
If there is a single measure or a set of measures of the meaning, richness, greatness of life, and if they are transparent to us.

Analytic Phenomenology

A precise definition of the problematic of Analytical Phenomenology will have to be worked out. But let us take that it is a combination of analytical philosophy and phenomenology.
It combines:
(1) Thematically, the primary concern with theories of consciousness, intentionality, and their relation to logic, epistemology, metaphysics etc. Shortly, Philosophy of Mind and Logic, Epistemology,Metaphysics.
(2) A method that makes use of modern logic and philosophical logic
(3) The phenomenological method needs some further refinements perhaps with help of logic and philosophical logic if the results of phenomenological reflection is going to be checked.
.
(n)
Of course this is only the roughest idea of this project.

Perhaps that phenomenology is not so popular today was due to historical accident, but it really needs some great representatives. The representatives will have to do some work that most philosophers will be under obligation to think over.

I am of course not under the illusion that I can do this kind of work.

Intentionality, Philosophical Logic

Vielleicht das einbisschen trivial ist, aber was ich sagen möchte ist das, dass eine systematische Interpretation und Darstellung Husserlscher(vielleicht nicht Husserls) philosophischen Logik sinnvoll und notwendig ist. Es wäre auch schön, wenn man auch die gegenwärtige Logic und philosophische Logik (Strawson und Quine, z.B)berücksichtigen. Ein solches Projekt würde deswegen auch Kenntnisse von gegenwärtigen Diskussionen in analytischer Philosohie benötigen.

Intentionality and Logic

Whether and how Idealities are somehow apprehended by consciousness is a issue which has been discussed for a long time. The works of Mohanty, McIntrye, Hinnttika, Follesdal on Husserl is of course insigtful. However, they do not offer a Systematic account about genesis of logic.

Now if the progress should be made, then it should be made by a project that SYSTEMATICALLY works out the logical origination of the core of our logic, the predicate logic: its elements, rules of formation, and rules of transformation. And, modalities of judgments should be also considered, hence, modal logic should be also taken into this account.

The clarification of the nature of logic and its relation to consciousness were worked out in the earlier works and through Husserl's Auseinandersetzung with his contemporaries, Frege, Brentano, etc.

However, the more systematic work belongs to the later stage, in his Formale und Transzendentale Logik, Erfahrung und Urteil, Passiv Synthese, etc. Here, the meaning of subject, individual being, its properties, relations, modalities were worked out in a systematic way. Scholars often characterize this stage as genetic phenomenology, true, but one should add it was a stage of genetic phenomenology about the systematic presentation of genesis of logic. Here the genesis should be understood as a genesis from transcendental subjectivity in a somewhat Kantian sense.

At the first stage, the difference between Husserl and Frege is of course already obvious. However, it's only after the fuller discovery of the both figures that we see the entire difference. Frege's systematic work is somewhat premature, he has a Begriffschrift before he has philosophical clarification for his system, his philosophical logic comes later than his Begriffschrift. Husserl's systematic work comes later than his philosophical clarification of concepts, and his system is also a system of clarification of logical concepts in terms of intentionality and constitution, not a formal language. His systematic work is primarily in the realm of philosophical logic rather than formal logic.

Philosophy, Depression, Conservative, Radical

On a conference called Armchair in Flames: Experimental Philosophy and its Critics
A: A survey shows that graduates in Philosophy are more depressed than the Professors.
B: Is it likely that they are more depressed than the graduates in other areas? I think this is likely.

An interesting observation is, the Germans and the senior and established american Philosophers are likely to be more conservative with regard to traditional practices of philosophy, while the new generation of philosophers in America tend to be critical of the tradition. It is likely that I do not have many instances of the established philosophers at this conference, but I actually have more instances that I have so far read.

Photos of Philosophers

Have found some Photos of some Philosphers from the Website of a Photographer Steve Pyke, finding them absolutely great, both the photos and the persons.
Just for example, http://www.pyke-eye.com/view/phil_II_05.html

Here is one of the Quotes:"By doing philosophy we can discover eternal and mind-independent truths about the real nature of the world by investigating our own conceptions of it, and by subjecting our most commonly or firmly held beliefs to what would otherwise be perversely strict scrutiny."

Typically armchair philosopher talk, one should say. Perhaps it is also a little bit Kantian.

From A Logical Point of View

Have heard that Quine's book From a Logical Point of View derives its name from a Pop song. Then I check it on YouTuBe, and it really is. Here it goes. The Singer is Robert Mitchum, well I do not know him before. The song sounds not very impressive to me. But here it goes.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNuLoLdW6_g

The First Blog

Logical Zombie

Frege: Wir teilen danach alle Wahrheiten, die einer Begründung bedürfen, in zwei Arten, indem der Beweis bei den einen rein logisch vorgehen kann, bei den anderen sich auf Erfahrungstatsachen stützen muss. Es ist aber wohl vereinbar, dass ein Satz zu der ersteren Art gehört und doch ohne Sinnestätigkeit nie in einem menschlichen Geiste zum Bewusstsein kommen könnte.(Da ohne Sinneswahrnehmung keine geistige Entwickelung bei den uns bekannten Wesen möglich ist, so gilt das letztere von allen Urteilen)--Begriffschrift, Vorwort

S.L: Then the possibility of Logical zombie. Suppose for a certain subject A, whose division of sensibility has been developing in just the same way as normal human being, it might also develop a way of logical thinking, however, it is later entirely lost. After a certain kind of surgery, it acquires a entirely new way of logical thinking from the former one. This latter logical thinking system is just like the kind of system of a computer, or that of a Zombie. Then, the question is, can we say that the subject is a Person, or it is half a zombie and half a person, or it is not a person at all?

A dialogue about movies

In H.A

S.T: I think Kubrik's film The Clockwork Orange is a great one. It tells something deep about morality. Alex, after the psychological treatment, does not become a good person, though he gets sick and throws out whenever he does something evil or bad, or when he sees something evil or bad. Alex can not even bear the sight of evil things not because he has some kind of conscience or consciousness of morality, but simply because, after the psychological treatment, the physical reaction to something bad is an effect. It is so to say, a physical stimuli-response.

R.L: Yes, the person who has some conscience will also not endure morally bad things, and it is supposed to be different from the situation of Alex's. Alex is conditioned purely physically, and he then is supposed to have no conscience. But to be physically conditioned can not be the reason why we do not take him to be a morally conscious person. Because, if the all the facts are physical, and as human beings, we are physical, then our conscience is also somehow physically conditioned. The only difference might be that the causal chain of this conscience is relatively NORMAL and complicated. So the difference between Alex and morally conscious person does not in the causality, but in the Normality of the causality.