My Personal Gettier Case：A friend has sent a postcard to me from Vienna

Story to be told...

Mach Bands

A simple experiment first(My Design):
Focus on the picture, and then push closer or draw further from the picture with constant speed, or otherwise, see what happens! One thing I find, among others, is this: The size of the area in the middle, and the color of the outer area really seem to change, though I know they have not. This is only a phenomenon of the normal optics. But it is obvious in this case than, say, in the case of observing your computer from different distance. In this case, we have
1) sensory phenomenology.It does not appear to be the same.
2)NonSensory phenomenology. It appears to be the same, nevertheless.

The following is from plato.stanford.edu
The thin dark bands along the outer edges of the gradients and the thin light bands along the inner edges of the gradients are optical illusions. The cause of this effect is due to contrast perception; we over process at boundaries and under process where there is constancy. In fact sensory response can even stop with unchanging stimulation. Mach is credited for discovering lateral inhibition in our sense organs, the idea that our senses pre-process information before sending it to the brain.

Since every retinal point perceives itself, so to speak, as above or below the average of its neighbors, there results a characteristic type of perception. Whatever is near the mean of the surroundings becomes effaced, whatever is above or below is disproportionately brought into prominence. One could say that the retina schematizes and caricatures. The teleological significance of this process is clear in itself. It is an analog of abstraction and of the formation of concepts. [Mach 1868, in Ratliff 1965: 306]

Let us first ask how we would find our way in the visual world if we would perceive, not relations of, but only differences in, illumination. One and the same thing in the same surroundings would become immediately unrecognizable with the slightest alteration of light intensity, such as when a cloud covers the sun. Should we still want to find our way, we would then have to habituate ourselves to maintain equal levels of light intensity, for instance by closing and opening our eyes. In fact, if this god of the psychophysical law were non-existent, the organism itself would have to devise it and, if the Darwinian theory is correct, it has devised it. The seeing of light intensity relations, within certain limits, is necessary for the existence of organisms. [Mach 1868 in Ratliff 1965: 300]
From plato.stanford.edu

Work Pretty Fast Today

Four Principles of Phenomenology

1.Consciousness has Phenomenological Features.
2.Phenomenological Constraint on Theories of Consciousness:(x)(if x is a theory of consciousness,then, it must obey the right phenomenological description of consciousness)
3. Principle of Reflexivability: (x)(if x is a phenomenological feature of consciousness, then, it is accessible to reflexion in principle)
4. Principle of Describability: (x) (if x is a phenomenolgical feature of consciousness & if it is reflected upon, then, x must be describable in principle).

This is my formulation of some principles I find in Husserl's phenomenology.

I find 1, 2,3 apparently convincing, but with regard to 3, I suspect that it is true, because the language we use does not seem to be able to describe everything we see in great details, esp. when it comes to consciousness. And unfortunately, this seems to bring some damage to the other two principles(2,3).

Husserl is the first one who uses TwinEarth Thought Experiment

Quite fanscinating:
Wie aber, wenn auf zwei Himmelskörpern zwei Menschen in völlig gleicher Umgebungserscheinung "dieselben" Gegenstände vorstellen und danach "dieselben" Aussagen orientieren? Hat das "dies" in beiden Fällen nicht eine verschiedene Bedeutung?(Hua XXVI,211-212,Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre)

My translation:
But how is it, when two people living on two planets,with entirely identical appearance of enviroments, represent the same objects, and then orient to have expression of the samething? Do not the "the" in both situations have the same meaning?
(Lectures on Theory of Meaning)

And now, guess what Husserl's Answer is!

态度

现象学态度是一种特殊的哲学态度。但是我们首先要理解什么哲学态度。为了理解，简便的方法是将其与其它态度，例如自然科学态度，联系并对照起来。在对待“什么是认知？”这个问题时，在自然科学态度下，自然科学家会在实验室里，构造各种认知环境，并通过对大脑，各种感觉器官和神经，进行经验性研究来回答。而处于哲学态度里的哲学家显然对这个问题有着不同的答案，他们甚至会对这个问题有不同的解释。例如Ingarden会认为，在哲学态度下，这是一个典型的“什么是X？”这样的问题，哲学态度就是把这类问题当作本质问题（Essentiale Fragen）来对待，因此这个问题就变成了“什么是X的本质”。[1]当然，“本质”这个词是非常可疑的哲学用语。不过，无论如何，这样的问题不会要求一个经验性的答案。当然，有些哲学家把这个问题理解为要求某种哲学分析。这个时候，对于“什么是认知？”，哲学答案可能是通过对“认知”或者“知道”做出分析来给出。例如：

(i) S知道p，当且仅当，S（1）具有信念p；（2）p为真；(3) S对p有充分的证据（或者，S相信p是得到辩护的）[2]。

这样的哲学分析是通过分析成真条件 (truth conditions)来给出的。一个完整的分析会给出充分必要条件。对于同样的问题，语言分析哲学家们可能会把这个问题理解成，什么是正确使用“S知道p”这个句子框架的充分必要条件，并给出相应的答案。

(i*) “S知道p”这个句子框架得到正确的使用，当且仅当， (1)---; (2)---;---;(n)--- 。

如果你是一个语言哲学家，那么你可能喜欢这个答案。不过，对于以上这个分析，我们也可以有一个本体论的解读，这个解读的形式可能是这样的：

(i**) S处于知道p的心灵状态m，当且仅当，(1)---; (2)---;---;(n)--- 。

很明显，处于不同态度下的主体会对同样的问题给出不同的答案。自然科学家们给出的是经验性的答案，这些答案可以通过进一步的实验而得到证伪。而哲学家们给出的答案，至少根据传统的区分和理解，则并不是经验性的答案。正确的分析被认为是先天可知的，并且甚至被认为是必然有效的。有些这样的哲学分析则可能是错误的，但是对它们的证伪一般不通过对经验事实的考察，而是通过进一步的哲学反思和分析。但是，科学家的研究结果和哲学家的分析并非没有关系的。如果在(i**)这个框架下我们提供了一个正确的分析，那么这对科学家的经验研究显然是有限制的。因为，在现实中，没有哪个心灵状态违反这个分析，却仍保持为一个相应的认知心灵状态。

当然，对于以上的说明，一个明显的反驳是这样的：这里所涉及到的不是不同的态度。 而是，他们显然对本来相同的问题进行了不同的再解读。例如，自然科学解读，哲学解读。哲学解释里又可以分为本质问题解读，语言哲学解读，本体论解读。然后，他们对这些不同的问题给出了不同的答案。但是，一个直接的回答是，原来的问题是有模糊的，所以留下了不同的解读空间。但正是不同的解读首先构成他们不同态度，其次才是给出相应的答案。

再从哲学史的角度举例，来让我们的观点更加直观一点。有些哲学家可能对某种态度有所偏爱，并把一种态度解释为另外一种态度。对于“什么是感知？”，甚至“什么是物质性事物？”这样的问题，Ayer就认为这是典型的语言分析问题，即使表面看来这是个事实性问题[1]。这也是所谓语言哲学转向之后一个比较普遍的态度。避开Ayer是否正确不谈。可以确定的是，这两个问题分别对洛克或者亚里士多德来说，并非语言分析问题。他们给出的答案，至少并不为他们设想为语言分析。这里，避开优劣不谈，我们似乎可以说，这里涉及到了不同的哲学态度。

我们列举了一些不同态度的例子，从这些例子中，对于什么构成某种特定态度，我们可以预先并非那么严格地归纳一下特征，并普遍化一下。我们可以说，一些基本的背景、预设会导致人们从不同的角度来解读甚至是一样的问题，并给出不同的答案。背景和预设，以及构成对一个问题的不同哲学解读和处理方式等，构成了某种特定的哲学态度的重要方面。这个规定当然远远不够精确和完整，但是我希望它能够初步说明我们对态度这个概念的理解。我们发现，上面列举的几种态度，都可以在自然科学和哲学的现实中找到很好的个例。

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[1] 这些问题被Ingarden普遍化为：“什么是X”这样的问题，但是他和Ayer的理解显然是不一样的，见上文。Ayer的观点，参见Ayer (1971), 64-65. “‘What is the nature of a material thing?’ is, like any other question of the form, a linguistic question, being a demand for a definition. And the propositions which are set forth in answer to it are linguistic propositions, even though they may be expressed in such a way that they seem to be factual. They are propositions about the relationship of symbols, and not about the properties of the things which the symbols denote.”

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[1] 参见 Ingarden (1925); Ryle (1927).

[2]这个例子来自Gettier (1963)。 Gettier在那篇文章的目的是对这个分析做出批评，不过这暂时和我们还没有什么关系。

Two Grammatical Jokes: We are all Naked! & Feeling Depressed

Wittgenstein:
We are all naked, underneath our clothes.

Chisholm:
I have a red book.
I have depressed feeling.
--------------------------
I have a least two things : a red book & a depressed feeling.
And we can also infer:
The book is red& The feeling is depressed.

The two sentences must be analysed differently.

What one would know if one is in a cartesian situation?

John Tienson says: A Lot!

Tienson at least provisionally endorses the assumption that
the Cartesian situation is possible. His position seems to be
this: this assumption is highly intuitive and, hence, should be
accepted so long as there is no compelling argument against it.
The considerations that are often taken to undercut this
assumption show only that successful reference requires that a
subject stand in the relevant causal relations to an external
environment. They do not show that entertaining intentional
contents requires this. Moreover, he thinks that there is a
plausible story about how narrow contents can contribute to
reference, in the proper environmental context.1 He concludes
that the assumption survives the standard externalist arguments
and that a thinker who is in the Cartesian situation will
know “plenty,” including “that he is presented with a rich,
complex, and coherent world” (Tienson, 58).

The Phenomenal and the Phenomenological

It is very common that the use of the Term "Phenomenological" is quite confusing. Consider the two typical expressions.
1) My phenomenology* of seeing an apple is different from my phenomenology of seeing a pineapple.
2) The phenomenology** of perception is different from the phenomenology of imagination.
Obviously, phenomenology* is different from phenomenology**. The former is used in an "experiential" sense, it says only that the experiential aspects in two cases of experiences are different. While the latter states that as two complex theories or description of two different kinds of experiences, they are different. In this sense, Phenomenology** is a disciplinary subject.

So may be it would be better to substitute phenomenology* with phenomenography, or some other terms, to avoid this ambiguity. Confusion of first order things and higher order things always tends to cause trouble in philosophizing.

We can say that phenomenology** is a discipline on Phenomenology*. But of course, Phenomenology** also must have its Phenomenology**(*), because in doing phenomenology, we obviously also have a Phenomenology*, which is different from doing Mathematics or Physics. This reiteration can go further, of course.

Of course phenomenology** can also have naturalistic and non-naturalistic (not anti-naturalistic) versions. Most analytic phenomenologists in the analytical philosophy tradition has a version of naturalistic phenomenology. E.g., Charlse Siewert (2006, In Favour of Plain Phenomenology; 2007, Who is afraid of Phenomenological Disputes), as well as Susanna Siegel, etc. Tim Crane is the single person I have known in the analytical tradition who comes closest to a non-naturalistic conception of phenomenology, at least and esp. when it comes to his theory of intentionality, esp., of intentional object.

Content of Experience?

There are Alternatives about the content of sensual experience such as:
1) Sensual experiences have no content, what are there are raw feels.
2) Sensual experiences have only sensory content.
3) Sensual experiences have two part content: Qualia and a belief.