John Searle's answer is "Yes". Not only it is true that causality belongs to the contents of perceptual experience, it is also argued that it is also experienced and discoverable from the first person perspective. That amounts to say:
1) When we perceive x, we do not only perceive x, under some aspects (e.g., x as such and such).
2) We also perceive x as the cause of our current perception, and this belongs to the content of this perception.
3) Upon reflection of the perception of x, we can have epistemic access to the experience of x as the cause of my perception of x.
But Searle's point seems to be dubious when it comes to 2) and 3). Shortly put, it is possible and very often that when we perceive x, we also experience x as the cause of our perception of x, and upon reflection we have access to this fact. However, this by no means suggest that for every perception, experience of causation must also be present in the entire content. I think it is not implausible that people can have perception without having a concept of causation at all. Thought experienment needs to be done, and a variation needs to be given to make this point...
So experience of causation is not a necessary condition for one to have perception. Now another question is, is it a sufficient condition?
Monday, August 10, 2009
Karl Mertens (Würzburg)
Mertens speciality lies in practical philosophy, he is one of the few Lehrstühle in Germany who has strong phenomenological (Husserlian) background.
In this september, there will be a big conference on Phenomenology in Würzburg.
In this september, there will be a big conference on Phenomenology in Würzburg.
Prof. Dr. Karl Mertens (Lehrstuhlinhaber)
Lehrstuhl II - Praktische Philosophie
Prof. Dr. Karl Mertens
Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Institut für Philosophie - Lehrstuhl II
Residenz - Südflügel
97070 Würzburg
Tel.: +49-(0)931-31-2857 (2859)
Fax: +49-(0)931-31-2855
eMail: 
Sunday, August 9, 2009
Two Harvard Analytic Phenomenologists: Sean Kelly and Susanna Siegel
Sean Kelly was a student of John Searle and Dreyfus, what a fascinating combination of teachers.
Susanna Siegel has done some very interesting work in the area of phenomenological method, esp., what counts as phenomenologically salient content. She is also a critic of the naturalistic theorists of intentional content such as Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, etc.
The two philosophers seem to make Havard one of the best places to study analytic phenomenology in the world!
So there are two analytic phenomenologists at Havard!
(1)
Susanna Siegel has done some very interesting work in the area of phenomenological method, esp., what counts as phenomenologically salient content. She is also a critic of the naturalistic theorists of intentional content such as Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, etc.
The two philosophers seem to make Havard one of the best places to study analytic phenomenology in the world!
So there are two analytic phenomenologists at Havard!
(1)
 | Professor | ||||||||
| Emerson 302 | |||||||||
| 617-495-3915 | |||||||||
| sdkelly@fas.harvard.edu | |||||||||
| http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~sdkelly | |||||||||
Sean Kelly earned an Sc.B. in Mathematics and Computer Science and an M.S. in Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences from Brown University in 1989. After several years as a graduate student in Logic and Methodology of Science, he finally received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley in 1998. He taught in Philosophy and the Humanities at Stanford and in Philosophy and Neuroscience at Princeton before joining the Harvard Faculty in 2006. His work focuses on various aspects of the philosophical, phenomenological, and cognitive neuroscientific nature of human experience. This gives him a broad forum: recent work has addressed, for example, the experience of time, the possibility of demonstrating that monkeys have blindsighted experience, and the understanding of the sacred in Homer. He has taught courses on 20th century French and German Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Perception, Imagination and Memory, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Literature. (2)
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Zahavi and Thomasson
Zahavi has some ambivalent thoughts about the interest from the side of analytical philosophers in phenomenology.
Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common
concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn
from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an
exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be
a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I
will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to
discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like
rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the
question of whether the current focus on the first-person perspective
might have a negative side-effect by giving us a slanted view of what
subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of
whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might
actually conceal some rather deep-rooted differences in the systematic
use these findings serve.(Zahavi 2007)
I think this attitude is quite understandable and I also share.
But there are also points that I cannot agree.
Amie Thomasson points out in her comments on Zahavi's paper, phenomenology is really better understood as transcendental if it is understood methodologically, and it really does not commit to any of the substantive views concerning the existence of the world and its relation to subjectivity. E.g., phenomenology per se, cannot give us argument concerning the real nature of the world, it does not accept, nor reject any version of idealism as it is traditionally understood. Although it might be compatible or incompatible with some of the versions.(Thomasson 2007) For example, if a version of idealism requires us to reject the structure of intentionality, which is an essential structure, then it is not compatible with the phenomenological insight, and it is therefore should be rejected on that ground. But certainly, many other versions of idealism can be perfectly compatible with phenomenological results.
But in any case, phenomenological essential insights are compatible with both idealism and realism, in the sense that it does not deny them nor accept them merely because they have the title as they do. This is not to deny, however, that it might not be compatible with some versions of them.
Again, about the status of consciousness and the world, Zahavi seems to hold that, consciousness is not on a par with the world. Surely it is not, but it would wrong to take this to be an ontological distinction, rather, this speaks out only an Epistemological Distinction, that we know our mind essentially differently from we know our minds(McCulloch 2003).
concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn
from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an
exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be
a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I
will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to
discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like
rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the
question of whether the current focus on the first-person perspective
might have a negative side-effect by giving us a slanted view of what
subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of
whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might
actually conceal some rather deep-rooted differences in the systematic
use these findings serve.(Zahavi 2007)
I think this attitude is quite understandable and I also share.
But there are also points that I cannot agree.
Amie Thomasson points out in her comments on Zahavi's paper, phenomenology is really better understood as transcendental if it is understood methodologically, and it really does not commit to any of the substantive views concerning the existence of the world and its relation to subjectivity. E.g., phenomenology per se, cannot give us argument concerning the real nature of the world, it does not accept, nor reject any version of idealism as it is traditionally understood. Although it might be compatible or incompatible with some of the versions.(Thomasson 2007) For example, if a version of idealism requires us to reject the structure of intentionality, which is an essential structure, then it is not compatible with the phenomenological insight, and it is therefore should be rejected on that ground. But certainly, many other versions of idealism can be perfectly compatible with phenomenological results.
But in any case, phenomenological essential insights are compatible with both idealism and realism, in the sense that it does not deny them nor accept them merely because they have the title as they do. This is not to deny, however, that it might not be compatible with some versions of them.
Again, about the status of consciousness and the world, Zahavi seems to hold that, consciousness is not on a par with the world. Surely it is not, but it would wrong to take this to be an ontological distinction, rather, this speaks out only an Epistemological Distinction, that we know our mind essentially differently from we know our minds(McCulloch 2003).
Philosopher of the Week: Amie Thomasson (Miami)
Amie Thomasson is really one of the finest philosophers I have seen working on an Analytic Phenomenology.
Her contributions are:
1. An interpretation of phenomenological reduction.
2.That of eidetic variation. She interprets it as a kind of conceptual analysis in the sense of Ryle.
Amie Thomasson (Ph.D., University of California-Irvine), Professor and Parodi Senior Scholar in Aesthetics. Her areas of specialization are in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and philosophy of art. She is the author of Ordinary Objects (Oxford University Press, 2007), Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and co-editor (with David W. Smith) of Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2005). In addition she has published numerous book chapters and articles on topics including metaontology, fiction, philosophy of mind and phenomenology, and the metaphysics of artifacts, works of art and other social objects. She is currently working on problems regarding modality, existence questions, and the methods of metaphysics.
Links: C.V. Publications Web Page
Her contributions are:
1. An interpretation of phenomenological reduction.
2.That of eidetic variation. She interprets it as a kind of conceptual analysis in the sense of Ryle.
Amie Thomasson (Ph.D., University of California-Irvine), Professor and Parodi Senior Scholar in Aesthetics. Her areas of specialization are in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and philosophy of art. She is the author of Ordinary Objects (Oxford University Press, 2007), Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and co-editor (with David W. Smith) of Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2005). In addition she has published numerous book chapters and articles on topics including metaontology, fiction, philosophy of mind and phenomenology, and the metaphysics of artifacts, works of art and other social objects. She is currently working on problems regarding modality, existence questions, and the methods of metaphysics.
Office: Ashe building, Rm. 701
Phone #: 305-284-5315
Email: thomasson@miami.edu
Links: C.V. Publications Web Page
Friday, August 7, 2009
Intentionality: Choice of Terminology
Literature on Intentionality is burdened by a mess of terminology. It is therefore desirable to choose and define one's terms very carefully when one writes about Intentionality.
When developing Husserl's theory of Intentionality, I think it is quite undesirable to continue to use his terminology like: Hyle, Noesis, Noema. But I should be very careful to use terms like: Content, Intentional Object, Correlate, Act, etc.
When developing Husserl's theory of Intentionality, I think it is quite undesirable to continue to use his terminology like: Hyle, Noesis, Noema. But I should be very careful to use terms like: Content, Intentional Object, Correlate, Act, etc.
Thursday, August 6, 2009
Hussserl:"Der Sinn der Wahrnehmung kann nicht abbrennen"
Consider the following sentences:
1) A mathematical form cannot burn.
2) The sense of perception cannot burn.
3) Water cannot burn.
4) This piece of wet wood cannot burn.
Now 1) and 2) have the same form as 3) and 4). But actually, 1) and 2) are either trivial (for logical and categorial reasons)or they are nonsense, whereas 3) and 4) offer important empirical information about things in the world.
The positive form of 1) "A Mathematical form can burn" is nonsensical, not because it contradicts some empirical fact, but because it abuses the meaning of "mathematical form". Therefore this sentence is nonsensical, it abuses grammar and it makes a category mistake in Ryle's and Husserl's sense. (See Husserl's example about the sense of the perception of a tree, later he comments that it is Widersinnig. See Bernet's quotation in his paper Husserls Begriff des Noema) So the negative form"--A mathematical form can burn" must also be nonsensical. Then the sentence "A mathematical form cannot burn", which is only a rephrase of the negative form must be nonsensical as well. But it seems to make sense. But if it expresses anything at all, it expresses only this :That "burn" is not something can be rightly applied to mathematical form according to their categorial form. In this way, it expresses something quite trivial, something about the use of words.
Now, I think 3) is in a position between 1),2) and 4), it expresses something emprical. Yet there is some differences here.
Consider:
5) This piece of wet wood can burn.
Makes perfect sense.
While
6) Water can burn.
is either (empirically) trivially false or makes no sense at all.
It seems to me the difference lies here, "wet wood" and some other similar things like "coal", "plastic" are the kind of things that can burn or fail to burn. If you want to know it, you need to find out empirically in each case. But in the case of "water", it seems that you can know without seeing. Then it seems to me that though "Water cannot burn" as well "Water can burn" make sense, they are quite trivial things to say. But in any case, if one says "Nonesense" to a person who says "Water can burn", I will not be suprised. If one says "Nonesense" to a person who says "This piece of wet wood can burn", then I must take him to say "It is false" not that "It is nonsensical".
1) A mathematical form cannot burn.
2) The sense of perception cannot burn.
3) Water cannot burn.
4) This piece of wet wood cannot burn.
Now 1) and 2) have the same form as 3) and 4). But actually, 1) and 2) are either trivial (for logical and categorial reasons)or they are nonsense, whereas 3) and 4) offer important empirical information about things in the world.
The positive form of 1) "A Mathematical form can burn" is nonsensical, not because it contradicts some empirical fact, but because it abuses the meaning of "mathematical form". Therefore this sentence is nonsensical, it abuses grammar and it makes a category mistake in Ryle's and Husserl's sense. (See Husserl's example about the sense of the perception of a tree, later he comments that it is Widersinnig. See Bernet's quotation in his paper Husserls Begriff des Noema) So the negative form"--A mathematical form can burn" must also be nonsensical. Then the sentence "A mathematical form cannot burn", which is only a rephrase of the negative form must be nonsensical as well. But it seems to make sense. But if it expresses anything at all, it expresses only this :That "burn" is not something can be rightly applied to mathematical form according to their categorial form. In this way, it expresses something quite trivial, something about the use of words.
Now, I think 3) is in a position between 1),2) and 4), it expresses something emprical. Yet there is some differences here.
Consider:
5) This piece of wet wood can burn.
Makes perfect sense.
While
6) Water can burn.
is either (empirically) trivially false or makes no sense at all.
It seems to me the difference lies here, "wet wood" and some other similar things like "coal", "plastic" are the kind of things that can burn or fail to burn. If you want to know it, you need to find out empirically in each case. But in the case of "water", it seems that you can know without seeing. Then it seems to me that though "Water cannot burn" as well "Water can burn" make sense, they are quite trivial things to say. But in any case, if one says "Nonesense" to a person who says "Water can burn", I will not be suprised. If one says "Nonesense" to a person who says "This piece of wet wood can burn", then I must take him to say "It is false" not that "It is nonsensical".
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Logical Geography of Concepts
Ryle and Strawson thinks that the task of philosopher is to offer a logical geography of our most important concepts. I do not doubt its sense, not at all.
But the scope of the discovery in philosophy seems to be larger than this. We do not onlyoffer a map for the already existing concepts.
I want to expand it a little bit, because there can be many mental phenomena which we still have no concepts for. This is suggested by Searle and Husserl. E.g., "background beliefs", "background presuppositions", "Retention", "Protention", etc. None of them are the concepts in our use when talking uncritically about the mind, yet they are important concepts, whose meaning determined in the process of philosophizing.
Now, this kind of thing happens always in the history of scientific discovery, why should it be any different in philosophy. It also has an real history in philosphy, the ideas of "Idea" or "Vorstellung", "Intentionalität" are simply inventions in the history of philosophy.
Hence, following the Analogy, the two aims of philosophy are:
1. To make a conceptual map for the land we have already stepped on. (Ryle, Strawson, Proper Task for Conservative Philosophers)
2. To discover the new land, name them, and then to make a conceptual map of it.(Task for More Adventurous Philosophers)
But the scope of the discovery in philosophy seems to be larger than this. We do not onlyoffer a map for the already existing concepts.
I want to expand it a little bit, because there can be many mental phenomena which we still have no concepts for. This is suggested by Searle and Husserl. E.g., "background beliefs", "background presuppositions", "Retention", "Protention", etc. None of them are the concepts in our use when talking uncritically about the mind, yet they are important concepts, whose meaning determined in the process of philosophizing.
Now, this kind of thing happens always in the history of scientific discovery, why should it be any different in philosophy. It also has an real history in philosphy, the ideas of "Idea" or "Vorstellung", "Intentionalität" are simply inventions in the history of philosophy.
Hence, following the Analogy, the two aims of philosophy are:
1. To make a conceptual map for the land we have already stepped on. (Ryle, Strawson, Proper Task for Conservative Philosophers)
2. To discover the new land, name them, and then to make a conceptual map of it.(Task for More Adventurous Philosophers)
Philosopher of the Week: Christian Beyer (Göttingen)
Endlich, ein Professor Ord., dessen Schwerpunkt in Phänomenologie liegt, und zwar in Göttingen.
Er ist noch sehr jung, 41. Ich erwarte viel von ihm.
Er verteidigt Follesdal's Interpretation Husserls Theorie der Intentionalität gegen Dan Zahavi. Ich werde eine neue Interpretation hearusarbeiten, die gründlich gegen Follesdal ist, und deswegen ist Beyer für mich noch interessanter.
Prof. Dr. Christian Beyer
http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/70428.html
Er ist noch sehr jung, 41. Ich erwarte viel von ihm.
Er verteidigt Follesdal's Interpretation Husserls Theorie der Intentionalität gegen Dan Zahavi. Ich werde eine neue Interpretation hearusarbeiten, die gründlich gegen Follesdal ist, und deswegen ist Beyer für mich noch interessanter.
Prof. Dr. Christian Beyer
http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/70428.html
Kurz-Vita
Geboren 1968; Studium der Philosophie, Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und Deutschen Sprache in Hamburg und Bielefeld; Magister Artium 1994 in Hamburg; 1994/5 Visiting Scholar in Stanford; Feb./März 1996 Assistenz in Oslo; Promotion 1999 in Hamburg; Jan.-Juni 2000 Temporary Lecturer in Philosophy in Sheffield; 2000-2005 wiss. Mitarbeiter in Erfurt; Habilitation 2004; 2005-2007 Heisenberg-Stipendiat der DFG; WS 2007/8 Berufung auf eine Professur für Theoretische Philosophie an der Universität Göttingen.
Schwerpunkte in Forschung und Lehre
Sprachphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes einschließlich der Philosophie der Person, Erkenntnistheorie, Phänomenologie (insbesondere Husserl).
Veröffentlichungen (Auswahl)
- Von Bolzano zu Husserl - Eine Untersuchung über den Ursprung der phänomenologischen Bedeutungslehre. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996.
- Intentionalität und Referenz - Eine sprachanalytische Studie zu Husserls transzendentaler Phänomenologie. Paderborn: mentis 2000.
- Subjektivität, Intersubjektivität, Personalität - Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie der Person. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 2006.
- (Als Herausgeber, zusammen mit Alex Burri:) Philosophical Knowledge - Its Possibility and Scope. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2007.
The Excitement of Philosophy and Tim Crane, Husserl
I think my excitement in philosophy basically has the following aspects:
1. To see how an excellent argument, a description, a theory can be clearly, powerfully presented.
2.To see how they can be right.
3. Also, it is very exciting to see how they are wrong.
The most painful thing in philosophical reading is that the text is so confusing that you cannot tell if it is right or wrong, despite my best effort.
I am reading Follesdals reinterpretation of Husserl's theory of intentionality, actulally, re-reading. I now believe no part of it, and I think I have found the mistakes in it, and I have a new interpretation to offer.
Strangely enough, I also find the person who is closet to Husserl is Tim Crane in the analytic tradition. I have read many (most) of Tim Crane's publications, and none of the central ideas are fundamentally different from Husserl's. Among which:
1. Intentional Object are just an Object which our thoughts direct. It has no substantial Nature. Therefore, this concept is an ontologically neutral concept.
2. The general structure of Intentionality.
3.The idea that the problem of intentionality is deeper than the problem of language. The order of explanation should be from intentionality to language, not other way around. This idea, I think, is also the idea of Searle. Philosophy of Language is a branch of Philosophy of Mind. Although, iterations can occur. Philosophy of Mind is a branch of philosophy of language, philosophy of language of mind. Yet, there can be other way around.
1. To see how an excellent argument, a description, a theory can be clearly, powerfully presented.
2.To see how they can be right.
3. Also, it is very exciting to see how they are wrong.
The most painful thing in philosophical reading is that the text is so confusing that you cannot tell if it is right or wrong, despite my best effort.
I am reading Follesdals reinterpretation of Husserl's theory of intentionality, actulally, re-reading. I now believe no part of it, and I think I have found the mistakes in it, and I have a new interpretation to offer.
Strangely enough, I also find the person who is closet to Husserl is Tim Crane in the analytic tradition. I have read many (most) of Tim Crane's publications, and none of the central ideas are fundamentally different from Husserl's. Among which:
1. Intentional Object are just an Object which our thoughts direct. It has no substantial Nature. Therefore, this concept is an ontologically neutral concept.
2. The general structure of Intentionality.
3.The idea that the problem of intentionality is deeper than the problem of language. The order of explanation should be from intentionality to language, not other way around. This idea, I think, is also the idea of Searle. Philosophy of Language is a branch of Philosophy of Mind. Although, iterations can occur. Philosophy of Mind is a branch of philosophy of language, philosophy of language of mind. Yet, there can be other way around.
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