Tim Crane against Husserl and Searle, etc

Tim Crane is certainly the most prominent and recent example of analytical philosophers who share the visions of phenomenologists broadly conceived, esp. Brentano and Husserl. I think he will serve as a central figure in my discussion of Intentionality too.

His views concerning the scope of intentionality is interesting enough, because he holds a form of Intentionalism, i.e., all conscious states are intentional states, including that of pain, sudden feeling of stress, itch, etc. In this respect, he is against Searle and Husserl, and also Churchland.

Knowledge as a Sub-Theme of Intentionality

Well, I first think I am researching into the problem of Knowledge, but I find out that it is not possible to account for knowledge without accounting for Intentionality, because to know something is simply a unique and special case of being in some intentional states. The general structure of Intentionality must also be shared by the mental acts of knowing.

Intentionality is a complex phenomenon, and its analysis requires the clarification of a network of concepts. But the clarification needs to be guided by a method, otherwise it will be chaotic, and one does not know what is a criterion of a satisfactory or adequate clarification.

However, the Method is something that requires a theory of Knowledge, e.g., what is the evidential status of a phenomena, how does eidetic variation function epistemically, how is the essential structure of something known, in this case, the structure of intentionality, etc.

Therefore, I decide to write a very ambitious dissertation on Method, Intentionality and Knowledge, though it is certainly beyond my ability at this stage. The Genesis of the title actually starts from Knowledge to Intentionality and to Methodology. But the dissertation will certainly begin with a methodological introduction, then to Intentionality and Knowledge.

Husserl and Intentionality

Smith&McIntrye's book Husserl and Intentionality is a very systematic book on Husserl's conception of Intentionality, and it ammounts to an interesting interpretation. But this book dissatisfies me as a book in phenomenology. 1.It does not seem to be phenomenological at all except the views are from the books that are called phenomenological. 2.I think we need a methodological introduction to a thesis on intentionality, as in the case of Mohanty's book.

By contrast, though Searle's book on Intentionality is not phenomenological, but analytical, it has obvious methodological presuppositions which are taken for granted in the analytical community, i.e. the method of Gilbert Ryle and Austin. Nevertheless, he has written something about the difference between intentional analysis and linguistic analysis. Intentional analysis can also be called phenomenological analysis, if you like the terminology.

Precisely, what primarily makes Husserl's theory different from Searle's theory is their methodological committment, firstly and mostly, the suspension of natural attitude and the turn to phenomena. Secondly and secondarily, the distinction between analysis and eidetic analysis of phenomena, but actually, I do not see them as essentially different, they can be seen as constituting the same method.

The Concept of Intentionality

Monhanty's book The Concept of Intentionality is of course a brilliant book. However, I think a methodological introduction will be necessary. 1. Phenomenological Method has essentially two steps, first, Phenomenological Reduction, and second, Eidetic Variation, each serves its particular purpose. 2. I think if we talk about the Concept of Intentionality, it would be nice if we have Gilbert Ryle's project of the Concept of Mind in mind, a sustained essay on mental concepts. Now, we have a sustained essay on intentional concepts.
Are all mental concepts intentional concepts? Like perception, knowing, willing, etc. Ok, now we have Searle's project.

It is better to have some rather than one ongoing project

I have been working on the same project for one entire month, and somehow I find it quite boring to work on one single project for such a long time. The project is on Phenomenological Concepts and Metaphysical Neutrality.
Therefore, I have decided to work on another project in the same time. I will be working on this project in this week, to see if I can work out an outline for the part of my dissertation on the conception of Knowledge.

Description of the Blog

I will share casual thoughts of mine here, primarily about philosophy.

Analysis Phenomenological Style

DEFINITION OF DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY: Ein unmittelbares Stück des Ganzen unterscheidet sich in der Weise der Explikation vom unmittelbaren unselbständigen Moment, und letzteres ist immer und notwendig „Eigenschaft“. Wir können Eigenschaft auch definieren als unmittelbares unselbständiges Moment eines Ganzen, oder als einen unmittelbaren Teil eines Ganzen, der neben sich im Ganzen keine unmittelbaren Teile hat, mit denen er „verbunden“ wäre.

COMMENT: I think this is how an analysis of Concepts and Phenomena is made through Phenomenological Description of the Gegebenheitsweise. Phenomenological analysis, in this sense, is to describe complex phenomena in simpler phenomena, as they present to consciousness. Of course this is not analysis by exact definition in terms of simpler concepts; nevertheless an exact definition of different concepts and phenomena is often the result. Different conceptions of Property are not only distinguished here, the definitions are also offered at the end, what is more, the whole process of Phenomenological Demonstration is Intuitively in order. His system can be formalized if you like, but this only involves part of the power it has. See, Kit Fine, Gilbert Null, Barry Smith, Peter Simons

Intentionality, perception, logical structure

“Logical structure” penetrates perception. As long as we perceive, even in a very primitive stage, intentionality functions in a structured way. The phenomena of “Certainty”, “Negation”, “Conjunction”, “Disjunction” and “Modality” can already be found at this primitive level.

However, at this level, it cannot be said that the experience is already “conceptual”, as it does not makes use of any concepts, such as “one”, “another”, “being”, “not”, “and”, “or” and “possible”, nevertheless it is “logical” in a sense. Whether experience should have all of the forms is an open question, however, it is beyond doubt that without the structure, experience is not possible at all.

The conditional, i.e., “if…then…” structure is somewhat complicated, because it originates from a somewhat complicated form of intentionality: protention, expectation.

However, the structure of Subject and Predicate, i.e., F(x), in predicate logic is a perhaps only a special example of pure logic which has something to do with our specific form of (temporal-spatially embodied) consciousness.

All the similar and identical features of various languages can be explained in a philosophy of mind which deals descriptively with intentionality. The privilege of this approach is that it explains the universal structure of language via descriptions of intentionality, and it does not have to make use of transcendental arguments to argue for the truth of some kind of a priori structure. It has great explanatory power as well as intuitiveness of demonstration.

Philosophy of language and philosophy of logic are branches of philosophy of mind. And insofar as philosophy of mind concerns itself with consciousness, it concerns with the universal structure of consciousness, i.e., intentionality.

The Measure

The idea is horrifying:
If there is a single measure or a set of measures of the meaning, richness, greatness of life, and if they are transparent to us.

Analytic Phenomenology

A precise definition of the problematic of Analytical Phenomenology will have to be worked out. But let us take that it is a combination of analytical philosophy and phenomenology.
It combines:
(1) Thematically, the primary concern with theories of consciousness, intentionality, and their relation to logic, epistemology, metaphysics etc. Shortly, Philosophy of Mind and Logic, Epistemology,Metaphysics.
(2) A method that makes use of modern logic and philosophical logic
(3) The phenomenological method needs some further refinements perhaps with help of logic and philosophical logic if the results of phenomenological reflection is going to be checked.
.
(n)
Of course this is only the roughest idea of this project.

Perhaps that phenomenology is not so popular today was due to historical accident, but it really needs some great representatives. The representatives will have to do some work that most philosophers will be under obligation to think over.

I am of course not under the illusion that I can do this kind of work.